



**Victim and Victim Led Organisation Perception
Survey Report on the Implementation of the
Government White Paper on the Report of the
Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations
Commission (TRRC)**



Victim and Victim Led Organisation Perception Survey Report on the Implementation of the Government White Paper on the Report of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	8
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.....	9
INTRODUCTION.....	12
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS.....	12
NHRC OVERSIGHT AND MONITORING.....	14
CIVIL SOCIETY PERSPECTIVE AND SHADOW MONITORING.....	15
GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.....	15
INTERNATIONAL NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS.....	16
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PERCEPTION STUDY.....	17
METHODOLOGY	18
DESK REVIEW.....	18
SURVEY DESIGN AND SAMPLING STRATEGY	19
DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS	19
ENUMERATOR RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING.....	19
DATA COLLECTION.....	20
DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS	20
REPORTING.....	20
FINDINGS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF VICTIMS.....	21
<i>Analysis of Demographic Profile of the Respondents.....</i>	<i>21</i>
NATURE OF VICTIMHOOD	24
<i>Direct Victim</i>	<i>24</i>
IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE	25
IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE ON VICTIMS (FAMILY)	26
<i>Nature of Human Rights Abuse (Direct Victims).....</i>	<i>28</i>
<i>Nature of Human Rights Abuse (Victim's Family).....</i>	<i>30</i>
AWARENESS	32
<i>Knowledge of TRRC</i>	<i>32</i>

<i>Knowledge of Government White Paper</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>Knowledge of White Paper implementation.....</i>	<i>36</i>
<i>NHRC OVERSIGHT MONITORING.....</i>	<i>37</i>
<i>CSO OVERSIGHT MONITORING</i>	<i>38</i>
<i>SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER</i>	<i>40</i>
Thematic Analysis on Awareness of TRRC & White Paper Implementation	42
Thematic Analysis of Views on the Implementation on the Government White Paper on the TRRC Report and Recommendations.....	42
Trust in Government Delivering Justice.....	44
Trust in NHRC Holding Government Accountable	45
FAIRNESS OF TRRC TO VICTIMS.....	46
Thematic Analysis on Perception of Trust, Fairness and Transparency.....	48
SATISFACTION WITH REPARATION.....	50
SATISFACTION WITH SECURITY SECTOR REFORM	52
SATISFACTION WITH JUDICIARY.....	53
SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION	54
Thematic analysis of satisfaction with prosecution	55
Thematic analysis pf satisfaction with reparation.....	56
Thematic analysis of satisfaction with security sector reforms	57
FORMS OF REPARATION	59
FORMS OF REPARATION	60
Thematic Analysis of Needs of Victims in Terms of Apology, Compensation or Support Services.....	61
GENDER NEEDS AND INCLUSION	62
YOUTH NEEDS	63
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (PWD) NEEDS ADDRESSED	65
Thematic Analysis of Inclusion of Victims and Marginalized Groups	66
Thematic Analysis of Needs of Women, Affected Communities	67
PARTICIPATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TRRC PROCESS	68
Personal Participation in TRRC Engagement.....	68
VICTIMS VOICES REPRESENTED.....	70

JUSTICE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT	71
Satisfaction with Justice Engagement	72
Extent to which Victims Perspectives were Heard and Considered	74
Thematic Analysis of Justice and Legal Reforms	75
Thematic Analysis of Institutional Reforms	76
COMMUNICATION.....	77
Perception of NHRC outreach on TRRC White Paper Implementation	78
Perception of CSO outreach on TRRC White Paper Implementation	79
Language to communicate TRRC implementation	81
Thematic analysis of communication effectiveness	83
GOVERNMENT HAS MANAGED VICTIMS' EXPECTATIONS	84
Government committed to implementation of TRRC White Paper.....	86
Findings from the perspective of shareholders.....	87
Awareness and understanding of TRRC findings and Government White Paper	87
Theme 1: Understanding and acceptance of TRRC findings and recommendations	87
Theme 2: Role of National Assembly in oversight and monitoring	88
Theme 3: Familiarity with legislative framework and obligations	88
Theme 4: Limited involvement in White Paper Development but active engagement in review	89
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT.....	90
Theme 1: Delegated oversight via National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)	90
Theme 2: Parliamentary structures for oversight and legislative scrutiny	91
Theme 3: Parliamentary actions on implementation progress and challenges	91
Theme 4: Progress in appointments and legal frameworks.....	92
LEGAL AND POLICY REFORMS	92
Theme 1: Passage of key laws implementing TRRC recommendations	92
Theme 2: Legislative status of institutions (special tribunal, medical board, Reparations Commission)	93
BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT OF TRRC IMPLEMENTATION	94
Theme 1: Parliamentary budget scrutiny and allocation	94
Theme 2: Perceptions of inadequate resources	95

Theme 3: Fiscal constraints and budget realities	95
Theme 4: Legislative roles vs. executive responsibility	96
Theme 5: Prospects for supplementary funding	96
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES.....	97
Theme 2: Institutional capacity for oversight	97
Theme 2: Political challenges in oversight	97
Theme 3: Opportunities to strengthen parliamentary accountability.....	98
VICTIM CENTRED APPROACH AND INCLUSIVITY	99
Theme 1: Institutional representation of vulnerable groups	99
Theme 2: The role of the National Assembly in inclusive implementation	100
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S ROLE IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE	101
Theme 1: Transparency and public engagement mechanisms.....	101
Theme 2: Legislative oversight and gap identification	101
Theme 3: Institutional and constitutional reforms for checks and balances	102
Theme 4: National Assembly role in the broader transitional justice framework	102
Theme 5: Legacy aspirations for Parliament.....	103
CONCLUSION.....	103
RECOMMENDATIONS	105
1. Accelerate reparations delivery	105
2. Enhance victim participation and communication	106
3. Improve transparency and independent oversight	106
MEDIUM TERM PRIORITIES (2026 – 2028)	106
4. Ensure accountability through prosecutions.....	106
5. Strengthen institutional coordination and capacity	106
LONG TERM PRIORITIES (2028 AND BEYOND)	107
6. Promote reconciliation alongside justice	107
7. Address international dimension of justice	107
REFERENCES	108
APPENDIX (Thematic analysis codes for KII)	109

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This Perception Survey of Victim and Victim Led Organisations on the Implementation of the Government White Paper on the Report of the TRRC would not have been possible without the generous financial and technical assistance of the OHCHR - UNDP Post-TRRC Project, which was funded by the UN Peace Building Fund. The UNPBF, OHCHR and UNDP are amongst the most steadfast partners of the Commission, and we remain grateful for their support since our establishment in 2019.

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

We hope the findings and recommendations of this Perception Survey will be given due consideration by the Government, in particular the Ministry of Justice and its Post-TRRC Unit, to encourage accelerated implementation of the White Paper on the Report of the TRRC, improve effective communication between Implementing Entities and victims, and ensure active participation and inclusion of victims, families of victims and victim-led and victims organisations in all matters concerning the implementation of the White Paper.

The Gambia's transitional justice process, following the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC), has entered a decisive implementation stage. The TRRC revealed gross human rights violations perpetrated under former President Yahya Jammeh and issued 265 recommendations, of which the Government accepted 263 in its May 2022 White Paper on the Report of the TRRC. Delivering on these commitments — reparations, justice and accountability, guarantees of non-repetition, institutional and legal reforms, capacity building, and peace and reconciliation measures — is central to restoring victims' dignity, strengthening the rule of law, and consolidating The Gambia's democratic transition.

This Perception Survey was undertaken to capture how victims, institutions, and the wider public perceive the progress of implementation since the TRRC and the Government White Paper. A **mixed-method approach** was used, combining a **quantitative survey**, **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)** with victims and affected communities, and **Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)** with **eight key institutions**: the MOJ Post-TRRC Office (Special Adviser on Transitional Justice), Ministry of Justice, National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Victims Centre, National Assembly, religious leaders/Supreme Islamic Council, Gambia Participates and The Gambia Federation of the Disabled. In addition, the Survey also interviewed the **family of a Ghanaian survivor of the 2005 West African migrants' massacre**, to reflect the experiences and concerns of non-Gambian victims who remain central to justice and accountability debates.

The **quantitative survey findings** reveal both recognition of progress and deep frustrations. While many Gambians acknowledged the TRRC's achievements in truth-telling and victim recognition, more than half of the respondents doubted that the Government would fully implement reparations and accountability measures. Urban respondents were particularly skeptical, while rural communities expressed mixed views — some showing cautious optimism. There was strong public agreement, however, that transitional justice must combine **material reparations with accountability for perpetrators** to be meaningful.

The **Focus Group Discussions** amplified the lived experiences of victims. Participants expressed appreciation for the TRRC's truth-telling process but voiced concern over **slow reparations, lack of psychosocial and livelihood support, and continued impunity**. Widows, orphans, youth, women, and persons with disabilities highlighted unique vulnerabilities and stressed the need for **inclusive and transparent reparations**. Many also underscored the absence of consistent communication from government institutions, which fuels uncertainty and distrust.

The **institutional interviews** provided further insights. The Post-TRRC Office (Office of the Special Adviser on Transitional Justice) plays a central role in coordinating the implementation of TRRC recommendations. While it has developed frameworks and engaged with stakeholders, victim groups often perceive its work as slow, overly bureaucratic, and lacking transparency. There are calls for the Office to be more visible, inclusive, and accountable to victims to maintain trust in the transitional justice process.

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ), as the lead agency for TRRC implementation, has developed a 2023–2027 Implementation Plan and overseen the passage of key laws, including the Victims Reparations Act (2023), the Ban from Public Office Act (2024), the Special Accountability Mechanism Act (2024), and the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act (2023). These measures establish frameworks for reparations, prosecutions, and institutional reforms. However, progress has been slow and uneven. While important steps have been taken—such as the swearing-in of the Reparations Commission, which only recently became operational, the Commissioners on 11 April 2025 and the passage of the Criminal Offences Act 2025 in March—several key measures remain pending or weakly enforced. The Ban from Public Office Act 2024 remains largely unenforced, the Special Prosecutor’s Office continues to face severe staffing and resource constraints, and reforms to prison laws and the Public Order Act are still outstanding. As a result, victim groups and civil society continue to criticise the Ministry of Justice for delays, weak communication, and a lack of urgency, warning that the slow pace risks undermining public trust in the transitional justice process.

The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has emerged as a key watchdog and partner in monitoring the implementation of the TRRC recommendations. The Commission consistently advocates for victim-centred approaches, timely reparations, and the protection of human rights defenders. While its independence is widely respected, the NHRC faces capacity and resource constraints that limit its ability to fully engage with victims across the country and provide consistent oversight. From the public’s perspective, there is recognition that the NHRC plays an important role in bridging government and citizens, with many respondents describing it as “the only institution we can trust to tell us the truth.” At the same time, some victims and CSOs expressed concern that the Commission’s visibility and follow-up at the community level remain inadequate, leading to calls for stronger outreach, regular public updates, and greater collaboration with grassroots groups to enhance accountability.

Traditional and religious leaders recognise their roles as custodians of peace and reconciliation, emphasising the need for support to sustain their contributions. However, some religious leaders continue to challenge aspects of the TRRC’s findings, creating tension between secular justice reforms and religious authority.

Civil society organisations and victims’ associations remain vital actors in advocating for justice and reparations. They stress the importance of inclusivity, transparency, and avoiding selective implementation, warning that failure to deliver tangible results could erode trust and perpetuate impunity. The family of the Ghanaian survivor of the migrants’ massacre underscored the international dimension of justice, noting that although the killings took place on Gambian soil, most of the victims were foreign nationals. They highlighted the pain of waiting for accountability and stressed that justice in The Gambia must also extend to non-Gambian victims, reinforcing the need for close collaboration with regional and international partners.

Overall, the study highlights five key findings:

1. **Victims are frustrated by delays**, with many losing hope in the Government's commitment to reparations and justice.
2. There is strong demand for **timely, fair, and transparent reparations**, particularly for the victims and their families.
3. **Accountability through prosecutions** is viewed as essential to genuine justice, alongside reconciliation.
4. **Poor communication and weak transparency** from the Ministry of Justice, the Post-TRRC Unit, and other implementing entities are eroding public trust in the transitional justice process.
5. **Fragmented institutional coordination** and limited resources are slowing the implementation process.

Thus, the TRRC created a strong foundation for truth and reconciliation, but the current transitional justice process is at risk of stalling. Victims and citizens remain hopeful yet impatient. To sustain trust, institutions — especially the Post-TRRC Office, Ministry of Justice, and NHRC — must accelerate action, ensure victim participation, and strengthen coordination. The inclusion of West African migrants among the victims — such as those from Ghana and other neighbouring countries killed in the 2005 massacre — underscores that justice in The Gambia is not only a national imperative but also a regional responsibility. Failure to deliver justice risks undermining both victims' dignity and the country's fragile democratic transition.

INTRODUCTION

TRRC Final Report and the Government White Paper

The Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) concluded its mandate in November 2021, producing a 17-volume Final Report with 265 recommendations addressing serious past violations, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and sexual and gender-based violence. In May 2022, the Government issued a White Paper accepting 263 of these recommendations, signalling an initial commitment to transitional justice. It also developed an Implementation Plan for its White Paper on the Recommendations of the TRRC 2023–2027. However, concerns about follow-through quickly emerged. Monitoring by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in 2022–2023 found that only 6 recommendations were fully implemented, 165 were ongoing, and 91 had not been acted upon. The following year, another independent monitoring exercise by the NHRC, covering May 2023 to May 2024, recorded a modest increase, with 16 recommendations fully implemented, 192 ongoing, and 55 unimplemented. This meant that after two years of the White Paper, barely over 6% of accepted recommendations had been completed, sustaining doubts about both political will and institutional capacity. In 2024, Government monitoring shifted from tracking whole recommendations to specific activities under each recommendation. While progress was most visible in areas such as legislative reform—where several key laws were enacted or reviewed—and public awareness-raising, core justice measures such as high-level prosecutions and reparations delivery remained slow, underscoring the need for stronger accountability mechanisms and sustained implementation momentum.

Government messaging emphasises commitment, but implementation is **slow and uneven**. The White Paper itself spells out numerous institutional reforms and reparations commitments, such as enforcing a ban on perpetrators and abusers, establishing a Reparations Commission, and reforming security-sector laws. However, as of 2024, most of these remain only partially realised. One local analyst warned that accepting but not acting on TRRC recommendations “is as good as rejecting them”. Omar Joof, a former student union leader and victims’ advocate, noted that “some victims...are still suffering from life-changing injuries and even a day-long delay in implementation is unacceptable”. His comments reflect widespread frustration that the “**Never Again**” commitment has yet to translate into concrete measures for victims or accountability for perpetrators.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

To guide implementation, the Ministry of Justice issued a **TRRC Implementation Plan (2023–2027)**. It outlines the creation of key bodies such as the Special Prosecutor’s Office and Reparations Commission, memorialization and timelines. In parallel, Parliament has enacted several TRRC-related laws. Notable legislative steps include:

- **Special Accountability Mechanism (TRRC) Act (April 2024):** Establishes the legal framework for prosecuting Jammeh-era crimes (via a Special Prosecutor, an elite High Court division, and a Special Tribunal under ECOWAS).

- **Ban from Public Office Act (Jan 2024):** Bans 40 named officials (from GAF, GPF, NIA/SIS, etc.) implicated by the TRRC from holding public office. President Barrow gave assent in January 2024, but actual enforcement awaits administrative action (e.g. issuing official notices and removing individuals).
- **Victims Reparations Act (Nov 2023):** Creates a national Victims' Fund and a seven-member Reparations Commission (including mandated representation of victims, youth, women, and persons with disabilities) to award reparations. Members were appointed in late 2024, and with Commissioners sworn in by April 2025.
- **Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act (2023):** Criminalises acts of torture in line with the UN Convention Against Torture, providing clear definitions, penalties, and safeguards. It closes significant legal gaps identified by the TRRC in protecting victims and prosecuting perpetrators.
- **Special Prosecutor's Office Act (2024):** This Act establishes the Special Prosecutor's Office as an independent authority mandated to investigate and prosecute crimes committed during the Jammeh era, particularly those documented by the TRRC. The law provides for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor with security of tenure, supported by an investigative and prosecutorial team. It outlines the jurisdiction of the Office to bring cases before the Special Tribunal (under the Special Accountability Mechanism Act 2024) and the High Court. While the legal foundation is in place, operationalisation has been slow due to limited staffing, budgetary constraints, and delayed infrastructure setup.
- **Criminal Offences Act (2025):** The Act repeals the outdated colonial-era Criminal Code and modernises The Gambia's substantive criminal law. It incorporates international human rights standards, clarifies definitions of core crimes, and strengthens protections for victims and defendants alike. The law is intended to close gaps identified by the TRRC in prosecuting human rights violations, torture, and other abuses. It also aligns domestic law with international conventions. However, while the Act represents a major legislative reform, implementation remains constrained by the need for capacity building of prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement officers.

Other laws — such as amendments to strengthen the prosecution of human rights crimes — have been proposed, but progress on full enactment lags. In March 2025, the National Assembly passed the Criminal Offences Act 2025, repealing the colonial-era Criminal Code, and the Criminal Procedure Act 2025, aimed at modernising due process guarantees. However, several TRRC-recommended reforms are still pending. The Prison Act and other outdated intelligence laws remain largely unreformed, and crucial guarantees of non-recurrence — such as repeal of the draconian Public Order Act — have yet to be addressed. Even where laws have been passed, implementation of new laws has been weak. For instance, although the Ban from Public Office Act 2024 is on the books, officials report that only letter

notifications have been drafted, and bodies like the ¹Special Prosecutor's Office still lack the staffing and resources needed to function effectively. **Key points in legislative rollout include:**

- **Some Legislative Progress, But Limited execution.** Laws creating accountability and reparations bodies have been passed, but these institutions are not yet fully operational. The Special Prosecutor's Office remains without full staffing and resources, while the newly established Reparations Commission has not yet commenced actual reparations payments to victims.
- **Delays and Budget Gaps Hinder Action.** Stakeholders note that budget allocations for TRRC follow-up remain modest. The NHRC has repeatedly urged Parliament to allocate adequate resources for implementation.
- **Political Considerations Influence Reform.** Certain recommendations – especially those involving high-ranking individuals – appear stalled. Civil society observers warn that “some of the recommendations...will have political repercussions,” and fear the Government is reluctant to “ruffle feathers” by prosecuting powerful figures.

NHRC OVERSIGHT AND MONITORING

The NHRC was mandated by the TRRC White Paper to independently monitor TRRC follow-up and report annually to the National Assembly. Its dedicated *Status Reports on TRRC Implementation* provide the most authoritative public audit of progress. Three such monitoring reports have been issued so far: May 2022–May 2023, May 2023–May 2024, and May 2024–May 2025, alongside its broader *State of Human Rights* and *Annual Activity Reports*. Overall, the NHRC commended the government for initial steps (such as enacting certain laws and holding public interface events) but highlighted critical shortfalls: insufficient funding, delayed timelines, and weak outreach. In its first Status Report (submitted June 2023), the NHRC noted that only 6 of 263 accepted recommendations were fully implemented, with 91 not yet started. In subsequent reports, the Commission has urged stronger follow-through. For example, the NHRC “urges the National Assembly to call on the government to accelerate the implementation of the White Paper... and to commit the necessary budgetary support.”¹ The Commission has also flagged participation gaps, warning that many rural and marginalised communities remain uninformed about TRRC follow-up and outcomes.

According to the NHRC, nearly three-quarters of accepted recommendations have been only partially implemented. The Commission has repeatedly emphasised the need to operationalise transitional justice mechanisms — including making the Reparations Commission fully functional, appointing judges to the Special Court, publishing the list of banned officials, and engaging more vigorously with victims' groups and civil society. It has also raised concerns over gender and disability inclusion. In summary, NHRC monitoring

¹ NHRC, *Status Report on the Implementation of the TRRC Recommendations*, June 2023.

paints a picture of unfulfilled commitments, with major recommendations still largely pending and only limited steps taken. The NHRC’s assessments are widely used by civil society to hold the government accountable, underscoring that timely justice and remedies remain unmet.

CIVIL SOCIETY PERSPECTIVE AND SHADOW MONITORING

Civil society and victims’ organisations have been vocal watchdogs. The Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG – a coalition of NGOs) and others conduct “shadow” monitoring of TRRC implementation. A broad critique from these groups is that the implementation process has lacked **TRANSPARENCY AND VICTIM-CENTEREDNESS**. The Centre for Victims of Human Rights (the “Victim Centre”) – which documented over 1,000 victims in its database – reports that victims feel forgotten. In forums and media, CSO leaders stress that the government must move beyond rhetoric. For example, TJWG activists have held public forums asking why **NOTHING** has changed for ordinary survivors. Several NGOs have prepared reports calling out implementation delays, budget shortfalls, and inadequate public information campaigns.

Prominent voices underscore civil society’s impatience. In October 2022, Omar Joof (ex-GAMSU president) said: “**ACCEPTING [THE TRRC RECOMMENDATIONS] WITHOUT IMPLEMENTING THEM IS AS GOOD AS REJECTING THEM**”. Other CSO statements echo this “impatient” tone. Gambia Participates (an umbrella NGO) and legal advocacy groups have demanded full disclosure of government plans. They criticise, for example, that the list of banned officials is still not public. Youth and student leaders have warned that continued inaction risks ²disillusioning a generation that spearheaded the 2016-2017 change. Women’s rights groups likewise have raised alarms that SGBV survivors are not consulted. These stakeholder accounts, while not always formally published, appear in media coverage and CSO position papers, consistently portraying implementation as **too slow and top-down**.

In short, civil society acts as a conscience and amplifier for victims’ voices. It highlights on-the-ground frustrations with the implementation process – especially among young people and victims – and presses for a truly **VICTIM-CENTERED** approach. Their analyses reinforce that political commitments have not yet translated into meaningful change for communities.

GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Gender justice was a prominent theme in the TRRC process: Volume 10 of the TRRC report documents pervasive sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) under the Jammeh regime. The White Paper explicitly “accepts” all SGBV-related recommendations and vows to prioritise the national SGBV action plan “to ensure that [women] can live full and dignified lives free from abuse”. It also calls for widespread education and empowerment initiatives for women. However, stakeholders note that actual follow-up has been **weak**.

² Section 60 (2)(b), Victims Reparations Act, 2023.

NHRC Victim Perception Survey on the Implementation of the Government White Paper, 2025.

The new Victims Reparations Act 2023 includes a gender-sensitive framework: it mandates that the reparations process be “victim-centred and gender-sensitive,” and requires that the appointed Commission include at least three women and a disability representative.¹ This represents progress in institutional design. The current Reparations Commission, established in 2025, includes many female and youth members. Nevertheless, grassroots advocates point out gaps. Many female survivors report they have not been sufficiently consulted in designing reparations or memorialization programs. They also cite a lack of psychosocial support services for SGBV victims. In one perception survey of SGBV survivors (NHRC Victim Perception Survey, 2025), women emphasised the need for “holistic” reparations – including childcare provision, education for children, regular financial support, and counselling – to mitigate stigma and trauma.² They noted that, to date, assistance has been piecemeal and not tailored to these needs.

Beyond gender, other intersectional concerns are raised. The Victims Reparations Act is notable for requiring at least one commissioner from a disability organisation, acknowledging persons with disabilities (PWDs) affected by abuses. However, monitoring reports by the NHRC (2023–2025) and findings from the Victim Perception Study (2025) suggest that rural communities and older persons — many of whom testified about witch-hunts or abuses linked to HIV/AIDS programmes — remain under-engaged in current outreach efforts. Women’s groups and Organisations of Persons with Disabilities stress that the Government should do more to reach remote areas and marginalised populations. In summary, while the Government White Paper on the Report of the TRRC and the NDP 2023–2027 affirm a commitment to inclusion of women, youth, and PWDs, activists warn that on-the-ground implementation is not yet fully intersectional.

INTERNATIONAL NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS

Gambia’s TRRC implementation must also align with Africa-wide and global standards. The **African Union’s Transitional Justice Policy (2019)** underscores national ownership, inclusiveness and non-recurrence. Crucially, it emphasizes that Transitional Justice (TJ) processes **MUST** engage marginalized groups: “Victims...have as a matter of principle the right to justice and truth...in processes in whose design they take an active part,” and that Transitional Justice must address the needs of “women and girls, youth and boys, the older persons and persons with disabilities”. These principles parallel the TRRC’s own ethos and bind the Gambia Government to fully involve victims – especially women – in implementation planning.

Similarly, the **UN’s Basic Principles on the Right to Remedy and Reparation (2005)** require States to provide victims of gross human-rights violations with access to truth, justice, and reparations. This includes prompt, effective remedies and public acknowledgement of harm. The Gambia’s Victims Reparations Act 2023 explicitly echoes these global norms by establishing legal recognition of victims’ rights. The Act affirms victims’ entitlement to reparations that address physical, psychological, and social harm – a standard drawn from the UN guidelines.

Gender-specific standards also apply. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30 (2013) calls on States Parties to ensure women’s “meaningful participation” in post-conflict justice and reconstruction. The UN Secretary-General’s Guidance Note on Transitional Justice (2010) similarly highlights that women’s inclusion is key to legitimacy. The Gambia has ratified CEDAW, and periodic UN reviews of The Gambia’s human rights reports, including CEDAW and the National Human Rights Reports to the UPR, have urged gender-responsive transitional justice. For instance, UN treaty bodies have commended The Gambia’s focus on women’s rights in the TRRC, but have also recommended accelerating reforms, including the prosecution of sexual violence, and aligning the process with international standards. In short, Gambia’s TRRC follow-up is not occurring in isolation; it is measured against broad African and UN commitments to comprehensive, inclusive justice and reparation for all victims.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PERCEPTION STUDY

In sum, the Perception Survey has shown that there is a **significant implementation gap** between policy and practice in the implementation of the Government White Paper on the Report of the TRRC. The Gambia Government has made key commitments on paper – with the White Paper and new laws broadly signalling progress – but most actions remain incomplete. Only a **small fraction** of TRRC recommendations are fully implemented. Major institutions, such as the Special Prosecutor’s Office and Reparations Commission, exist largely on paper or in nascent form. Funding and staffing shortfalls, coupled with political sensitivity around prosecutions, have slowed justice delivery.

Victims and civil society are increasingly skeptical of the Government’s commitment to effectively implement the White Paper. Public confidence risks erosion, especially among those who anticipated real change. Gaps in outreach mean that many Gambians are unaware of what has or has not been done. Gender and intersectional issues remain a concern: although laws call for inclusive processes, survivors of SGBV report inadequate support, and women’s voices are still underrepresented in decision-making.

Implications for perception research: A timely, perception-focused study should examine these issues directly with Gambians. Key questions include:

- **Awareness and understanding:** How well do citizens, especially in rural/marginalised areas, know about the TRRC’s recommendations and the White Paper commitments?
- **Trust in justice mechanisms:** What is the level of public trust in institutions (courts, Special Prosecutor, NHRC) to deliver justice based on TRRC findings? Have recent trials or prosecutions affected confidence?
- **Victim satisfaction:** Are identified victims satisfied with how reparations and apologies are being handled? Do they feel consulted and supported?
- **Gendered perceptions:** How do women and men differ in their views of the justice and reparations process? Are women aware of gender-specific measures (e.g. SGBV reforms)?

- **Community engagement:** Do communities feel included in transitional justice planning (e.g. town halls, consultations)? What do citizens expect as visible outcomes of the TRRC process?

Collecting these perceptions will provide much-needed empirical feedback to policymakers and partners. It can identify priority areas for action – such as improving public communication, accelerating operationalisation of laws, and ensuring victim-centred, gender-sensitive approaches. In a context where stakeholders have growing concerns over political will and transparency, documenting ordinary Gambians’ views will help hold implementers accountable and guide future advocacy.

After the data collection was done, the team of researchers analysed the data using mainly STATA (and Excel) and the findings are contained in this report. The next section details the findings according to the major sections in the questionnaire.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this Perception Survey was anchored in a rigorous, participatory, and contextually grounded mixed-methods approach. By combining the breadth of quantitative data with the depth of qualitative insights, the study sought to capture the diverse and nuanced perspectives of victims, victim-led and victim-focused organisations, civil society actors, and implementing institutions on the implementation of the Government White Paper. The design upheld the highest standards of scientific integrity, ethical practice, and inclusivity, ensuring that the voices of victims, survivors of Jammeh-era human rights violations, women, youth, and marginalised rural communities were meaningfully reflected. In doing so, the methodology generated not only statistically valid data but also rich narratives that place affected populations at the centre of the analysis.

DESK REVIEW

The study commenced with an extensive desk review that provided the conceptual and policy grounding for survey tools and perception indicators. This review examined critical documents, including the TRRC Final Report and Recommendations, the Government White Paper (2022), and the Implementation Plan (2023–2027). It also reviewed enabling legislation such as the Victims Reparations Act (2023), annual TRRC Monitoring Status Reports of the NHRC, and the Transitional Justice Working Group’s (TJWG) advocacy reports. Regional and international normative frameworks were also analysed, including the African Union’s Transitional Justice Policy and relevant UN guidelines on transitional justice, victim participation, and gender justice.

The desk review informed the development of core perception indicators such as awareness, trust, fairness, participation, transparency, accountability, and gender sensitivity. These guided the design of both the quantitative questionnaire and the qualitative guides, ensuring close alignment with TRRC themes and the government’s implementation milestones.

SURVEY DESIGN AND SAMPLING STRATEGY

The quantitative component was designed as a large-scale, census-type survey targeting victims of Jammeh-era human rights violations, including survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). A total of 746 respondents were interviewed nationwide, drawn directly from the official victim database of the Victim Centre. This approach ensured broad coverage across all eight Local Government Areas (LGAs) of The Gambia, although for analytical purposes, Banjul and Kanifing Municipality were combined into a single Greater Banjul Area (GBA).

The sample frame was stratified by region to ensure proportional representation, with random selection within each LGA to safeguard fairness and inclusivity. Special attention was given to ensure that women, rural residents, and persons with disabilities—often underrepresented in governance and accountability research—were meaningfully included.

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Three main tools were developed, pre-tested, and deployed:

- **Structured Household Questionnaire** – The principal quantitative instrument, designed to measure levels of awareness, trust, satisfaction, fairness, and perceptions of White Paper implementation. Likert-scale, multiple-choice, and open-ended questions were included. The tool was translated into Mandinka, Wolof, Fula, Jola, and Serahule to ensure accessibility.
- **Key Informant Interview (KII) Guide** – Developed for one-on-one, in-depth interviews with government officials (Ministry of Justice, Post-TRRC Office/Special Adviser, NHRC), parliamentarians, the Victim Centre, CSOs, religious leaders, and the Gambia Federation of the Disabled. These interviews probed institutional perspectives on accountability, transparency, and reform progress.
- **Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Guide** – Tailored for victims' communities, engaging men, women, youth, and elders. A trauma-informed, participatory approach was applied, using storytelling, scenario testing, and open dialogue to explore perceptions of justice, reconciliation, and reparations.

In addition, the study included a targeted interview with the family of a Ghanaian survivor of the 2005 West African migrants' massacre, reflecting the experiences of non-Gambian victims still central to justice and accountability debates.

ENUMERATOR RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

Enumerators and supervisors were recruited based on language proficiency, regional familiarity, and gender balance, with at least 50% female representation to ensure sensitivity in interviewing survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.

Training was intensive and practical, covering research ethics, informed consent, trauma-sensitive interviewing, GBV protocols, and transitional justice concepts. Enumerators also received hands-on sessions in digital data collection using mobile tablets. Role plays, field simulations, and mock interviews were conducted to standardise skills and ensure consistency.

DATA COLLECTION

Fieldwork took place between **July and August 2025** across all LGAs. All surveys were administered **face-to-face** in respondents' homes and communities, ensuring inclusion of rural residents and victims without digital access.

Key informant interviews were also conducted in person, with audio recordings (where permitted) and detailed notes taken. Focus group discussions were facilitated in safe and familiar community spaces, providing a supportive environment for open sharing. All interactions followed strict ethical protocols, with informed consent obtained in advance. Respondents requiring psychosocial or medical support were referred to NHRC-approved service providers.

DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

Quantitative survey data were captured electronically in real-time and uploaded into a secure database. After cleaning and validation, statistical analysis was conducted using **STATA 17** and Microsoft Excel. Analyses included descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations by gender, region, and age, and confidence intervals. Findings were visualised through charts and tables.

Qualitative data from KIIs and FGDs were transcribed, coded, and thematically analysed. Manual coding and NVivo 14 software were used to identify recurring themes, divergences, and patterns across stakeholder groups. The FGDs were anonymised, with participants assigned codes (e.g., P1, P2) to protect confidentiality. Thematic and content analyses were supported with verbatim quotations to retain the authenticity of participants' voices.

REPORTING

Findings from both quantitative and qualitative streams were triangulated to provide a holistic picture of perceptions on TRRC implementation. The final report integrates statistical evidence with lived experiences, highlighting both national trends and regional nuances. This approach ensures that the outputs are not only analytically robust but also grounded in the voices of those most directly affected by past violations and current reforms.

FINDINGS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF VICTIMS

Analysis of Demographic Profile of the Respondents

A total of 746 individuals participated in the perception study on the implementation of the Government White Paper on the Report of the TRRC. The socio-demographic characteristics of respondents provide essential context for understanding the perspectives and priorities expressed throughout the Study, particularly in relation to victims' awareness, confidence levels, and expectations regarding transitional justice in The Gambia.

The sample consisted of 44 per cent female and 56 per cent male respondents. While both genders are substantially represented, the slightly higher proportion of men may reflect the composition of direct victims or those more engaged in public consultations. Given that experiences of violations and expectations of transitional justice can vary by gender, this distribution highlights the importance of interpreting findings through a gender-sensitive lens.

Almost half of the respondents (48 per cent) reported being employed, while 52 per cent were unemployed at the time of the survey. The relatively high unemployment rate points to a degree of economic vulnerability among participants, which could influence their priorities for reparations, livelihood support, and other socio-economic measures within the implementation of TRRC recommendations.

An overwhelming majority (almost 100 per cent) of respondents identified as Muslim, reflecting the religious composition of the country. This homogeneity means that religious affiliation is unlikely to be a differentiating factor in perceptions of the TRRC process, though faith-based values may still shape individual attitudes toward reconciliation and justice.

A significant majority (84 per cent) of respondents were married. This high rate of marital status indicates that many participants' views and expectations are likely influenced not only by personal experiences but also by household and family considerations, such as the need for collective well-being and intergenerational healing.

Notably, 84 per cent of participants identified as direct victims of human rights violations addressed by the TRRC. This strong victim representation ensures that the findings of this study are firmly grounded in the perspectives of those most directly affected by past abuses, providing a credible basis for assessing the Government's implementation of the White Paper. Ethnic representation in the sample reflects The Gambia's diversity, though with a clear majority of Mandinka respondents (61 per cent), Wolof (16 per cent) and Fula (15 per cent) communities also had notable representation, while smaller proportions identified as Jola (2 per cent), Serahuli (1 per cent), Serer (3 per cent), and other ethnic groups (2 per cent). This diversity is important to ensure that the study captures a range of cultural perspectives on transitional justice, especially given the historical and social dynamics between ethnic groups in the country.

Educational levels among respondents varied, though overall attainment was relatively low. The largest proportion (40 per cent) reported attending Madarasa (Islamic schooling),

followed by those with no formal education (23 per cent). Secondary school completion (SSS) accounted for 13 per cent, while 8 per cent completed primary education, and 7 per cent reached the Upper Basic School (UBS) level. Only small proportions held post-secondary qualifications, with 4 per cent having a diploma, 2 per cent a Bachelor's degree, and 1 per cent a Master's degree. These findings underscore the need for communication strategies on the White Paper Implementation that are accessible to individuals with limited literacy, prioritising oral, visual, and local-language channels.

Income distribution revealed that a majority of households fall within low-income brackets. About 27 per cent reported earnings below GMD 5,000 per month, 21 per cent earned between GMD 5,000–10,000, and 22 per cent between GMD 10,000–15,000. Only 8 per cent earned above GMD 20,000, while 10 per cent reported earnings between GMD 15,000 and 20,000. Around 11 per cent preferred not to disclose their income. The high proportion of low-income households suggests that economic hardship is a significant contextual factor influencing perceptions of justice and expectations of reparations.

Respondents were drawn from all Local Government Areas (LGAs), ensuring broad geographic coverage. The largest proportion resided in the West Coast Region (30 per cent), followed by the North Bank Region (22 per cent), Lower River Region (17 per cent), Central River Region (North) (13 per cent), Upper River Region (10 per cent), and Central River Region (South) (6 per cent). Only 3 per cent came from the Greater Banjul Area. This strong representation from rural regions highlights the importance of ensuring that TRRC-related outreach, consultations, and reparations programs are not overly concentrated in urban areas.

Overall, the socio-demographic profile of respondents indicates a study population that is predominantly rural, economically vulnerable, with relatively low formal education levels, and heavily composed of direct victims. Ethnic diversity is represented, though Mandinka respondents form the majority. The findings suggest that effective implementation of the TRRC White Paper will require targeted outreach to low-literacy populations, consideration of rural access constraints, and socio-economic support that addresses victims' livelihood needs. Furthermore, the balance between male and female perspectives in the dataset provides a valuable opportunity to integrate gender-sensitive recommendations into transitional justice strategies.

Table 1: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents					
	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Female	746	0.44	0.50	0	1
Employed	746	0.48	0.50	0	1
Muslim	746	1.00	0.04	0	1
Married	746	0.84	0.37	0	1
Direct Victim	746	0.84	0.37	0	1
Ethnicity	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Mandinka	746	0.61	0.49	0	1
Wolof	746	0.16	0.37	0	1
Fula	746	0.15	0.36	0	1
Jola	746	0.02	0.14	0	1
Serahuli	746	0.01	0.08	0	1


Serer	746	0.03	0.18	0	1
Others	746	0.01	0.09	0	1
Level of Education	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
None	746	0.23	0.42	0	1
Primary	746	0.08	0.27	0	1
UBS	746	0.07	0.26	0	1
SSS	746	0.13	0.34	0	1
Madarasa	746	0.40	0.49	0	1
Diploma	746	0.04	0.19	0	1
Bachelor	746	0.02	0.13	0	1
Masters	746	0.01	0.10	0	1
PhD	746	0.00	0.04	0	1
Others	746	0.02	0.14	0	1
Income of Household	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Below five	746	0.27	0.45	0	1
Five to ten	746	0.21	0.41	0	1
Ten to fifteen	746	0.22	0.41	0	1
Fifteen to twenty	746	0.10	0.30	0	1
Above twenty	746	0.08	0.27	0	1
Prefer not say	746	0.11	0.32	0	1
Local Government Area/region	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Greater Banjul Area (GBA)	746	0.03	0.16	0	1
West Coast Region (WCR)	746	0.30	0.46	0	1
North Bank Region (NBR)	746	0.22	0.41	0	1
Lower River Region (LRR)	746	0.17	0.38	0	1
Central River Region (North)	746	0.13	0.33	0	1
Central River Region (South)	746	0.06	0.24	0	1
Upper River Region (URR)	746	0.10	0.30	0	1

NATURE OF VICTIMHOOD

Direct Victim

Figure 1 reveals that a substantial majority (84 per cent) of respondents identify as direct victims of the human rights violations addressed by the TRRC. This high proportion confirms that the survey effectively reached the population most affected by past abuses, ensuring the findings are grounded in lived experiences rather than second-hand perceptions. The remaining 16 per cent who did not identify as direct victims may still have been indirectly affected — through family, community, or economic consequences — but their perspectives provide an important comparative benchmark

Figure 1: Nature of Victimhood



When disaggregated by Local Government Areas (LGAs), significant variation emerges in the prevalence of direct victimhood. The North Bank Region (NBR) and Central River Region (North) reported the highest levels of direct victimhood at 97% each, suggesting that these areas bore particularly heavy burdens during the periods of abuse under investigation. Similarly, the West Coast Region (WCR) also reported a high victim rate of 86%, indicating substantial localised impact. The Lower River Region (LRR) followed closely with 76% direct victims, reflecting both its sizeable rural population and the vulnerability of communities that were directly targeted during the Jammeh era.


In contrast, the **Central River Region (South)** reported the lowest proportion of direct victims (62 per cent), followed by the **Upper River Region (URR)** (66 per cent) and the **Greater Banjul Area (GBA)** (74 per cent). While still representing a majority, these lower figures may reflect either lower levels of direct abuse in these regions or greater numbers of individuals who were indirectly rather than directly affected. The distribution suggests that while victimisation was widespread, it was not evenly experienced across the country, with certain regions bearing a disproportionate share of harm. It is important to note that not all victims reached out to the TRRC, which may contribute to the risk of underreporting.

IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE

The survey results show that the impact of human rights abuses on direct victims in The Gambia is overwhelmingly severe. Nearly all respondents (99 per cent) described their experiences as either highly devastating (49 per cent) or devastating (50 per cent), with only one per cent rating the impact as moderate and none reporting no impact. This highlights the deep and lasting consequences of abuse, underscoring how profoundly victims' lives, livelihoods, and sense of security have been affected nationwide. The findings confirm that human rights violations are not isolated events but collective traumas with far-reaching implications for individual recovery and national reconciliation.

When examined by region, variations emerge, though the overall pattern of severe devastation remains constant. In areas such as the Greater Banjul Area, West Coast, North Bank, Lower River, and Central River North, victims reported a balance between highly devastating and devastating impacts. In contrast, rural regions—particularly Central River South and the Upper River Region—recorded the most extreme responses, with 79 per cent and 81 per cent, respectively, placing the impact at the highest levels of severity. These regional findings point to the need for targeted psychosocial and reparations programs that address both the universal and localised consequences of human rights abuses.


Figure 2: Impact of Human Rights Abuse



IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE ON VICTIMS (FAMILY)

The findings reveal that human rights violations not only affected direct victims but also had profound and lasting consequences for their families. When asked to assess the degree of impact, a clear majority of respondents described the effect on families as severe: **56 per cent** reported the impact as “**highly devastating**”, while **42 per cent** described it as “**devastating**”. Only **1 per cent** rated the impact as “**moderate**” and another **1 per cent** indicated there was “**no impact**”. This overwhelming concentration in the “**highly devastating**” and “**devastating**” categories reflects the deep personal, social, and economic harm that violations caused within the household unit.

Figure 3: Impact of Human Rights Abuse (Victim's Family)



The study found that these impacts go beyond the immediate physical harm to victims. They often include the loss of a breadwinner, disruption of children's education, deterioration in mental health, breakdown of family cohesion, and lasting social stigma. In many cases, family members became secondary victims, shouldering the burden of care for injured relatives, facing economic hardship, and living with ongoing trauma.

The severity of family impact varied significantly across Local Government Areas (LGAs). The West Coast Region (WCR) reported the highest rate of "highly devastating" impact at 85 per cent, suggesting that violations in this area left families facing profound emotional and economic disruption. In the North Bank Region (NBR) and the Greater Banjul Area (GBA), the pattern was slightly different, with a majority describing the impact as "devastating" rather than "highly devastating"—66 per cent in NBR and 80 per cent in GBA. This difference may reflect variations in the types of violations experienced, the availability of coping mechanisms, or the level of community support.

In rural areas, the Central River Region – South (75 per cent) and the Upper River Region (74 per cent) reported very high levels of “devastating” impact, underscoring the acute hardship faced by communities where economic resources and access to services are already limited. The Central River Region – North displayed a more balanced distribution, with 55 per cent reporting a “highly devastating” impact and 45 per cent reporting a “devastating” impact. This indicates that, while nearly all families have experienced severe consequences, the intensity of harm varied. Similarly, the Lower River Region reported 63 per cent “highly devastating” and 35 per cent “devastating” impacts, pointing to deep socio-economic vulnerabilities within these communities.


The data make it clear that the impact of human rights violations on families is overwhelmingly negative, with little regional variation in the sense that almost all areas report high levels of devastation. However, the degree of impact — whether “highly devastating” or “devastating” — offers important nuance for transitional justice programming

Nature of Human Rights Abuse (Direct Victims)

The data on the nature of human rights abuses reveals a broad spectrum of violations, which “underscores the widespread use of arbitrary detention as a primary tool of repression. Torture, cited by 29% of respondents, is another significant abuse, highlighting the severe physical and psychological harm inflicted on victims. Witch-hunt accusations were reported by 27% of respondents, pointing to targeted persecution often rooted in social stigma, fear, or political motives.

Less common, but still concerning, forms of abuse include enforced disappearance (8%), dismissal from employment (4%), sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (2%), execution (killing) (2%), and persecution related to student demonstrations (2%). Notably, no respondents reported HIV-related persecution, which may reflect either its absence in the dataset or underreporting due to stigma. A further 7% reported “other” forms of abuse, capturing miscellaneous violations not explicitly categorised.

Figure 4: Nature of Human Rights Abuse



Regional patterns reveal important variations. For example, the West Coast Region (WCR) and North Bank Region (NBR) recorded the highest rates of imprisonment, exceeding 70%, while the Central River Region (South) also showed high levels of both imprisonment and torture. Disappearances were notably more common in the Central River Region (North) and the Greater Banjul Area (GBA), while witch-hunt accusations were particularly prominent in the GBA and the Upper River Region (URR). These regional differences point to localised patterns of abuse, suggesting that certain violations may be linked to specific political, cultural, or historical contexts.

Overall, the data illustrate that human rights violations in the studied context are not only widespread but also multifaceted, with a heavy reliance on imprisonment and torture, supplemented by a range of other coercive and punitive measures. The regional disparities


emphasise the need for locally tailored interventions and further qualitative investigation into the drivers of specific abuses in different areas.

Nature of Human Rights Abuse (Victim's Family)

The data indicate that families of victims experienced a wide range of human rights abuses, many of which mirror the violations suffered by the direct victims themselves. The findings must be interpreted with the understanding that, while the study primarily targeted direct victims, in several cases the respondents were indirect victims, often family members, due to the unavailability of direct victims, either because they had passed away or could not be reached. This context is critical in appreciating the lived reality of the families, as the consequences of abuses extend beyond the immediate victim to deeply affect their relatives. The study found that the most common violation reported by families was imprisonment of a relative (57 per cent), reflecting the widespread use of arbitrary detention as a tool of repression. While the act of imprisonment directly targeted the victim, the consequences reverberated through their households—removing breadwinners and protectors and creating prolonged uncertainty and emotional distress for dependents. Torture, reported in 35 per cent of cases, was similarly experienced by family members as indirect harm. Though inflicted directly on the victims, its physical and psychological consequences also deeply affected their households, which bore the burden of care, trauma, and stigma.

Other forms of abuse, though less frequent, also had devastating ripple effects on families. Disappearances (9 per cent) and executions (killings) (8 per cent) represent the most extreme violations, leaving relatives without closure, justice, or the ability to perform cultural or religious rites. Witch hunts (20 per cent) were another disturbing practice that, while directed at specific individuals, extended stigma and social exclusion to their entire families, undermining community standing and limiting future opportunities. In this way, families became secondary victims, carrying the social, emotional, and economic consequences of violations committed against their loved ones. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (2 per cent), while reported at lower levels, likely reflects underreporting due to stigma, fear, or cultural sensitivity. Similarly, other abuses (10 per cent) indicate a spectrum of rights violations that do not fit neatly into conventional categories but contributed to the suffering of families.

Figure 5: Nature of Human Rights Abuse (Family)



The regional analysis reveals that imprisonment of relatives was consistently the most common violation reported across all areas, with particularly high rates in CRR South, CRR North, and WCR. Families explained that while it was their loved ones who were directly subjected to detention, the impacts extended to the entire household, removing breadwinners, disrupting education, and creating long periods of anxiety and uncertainty. Torture was also widely reported, though again this referred to the treatment of relatives who were direct victims. Households nonetheless experienced the consequences second-hand, bearing the burden of caring for traumatised survivors, dealing with stigma, and coping with the long-term psychological effects on the family unit.

Some regions also reported higher incidences of enforced disappearances and witch hunts. In these cases, families were again not the direct targets but became secondary victims—left without closure in the case of disappearances or stigmatised and socially excluded in the case


of witch hunts. These localised patterns suggest that certain abuses were tied to specific political or social dynamics within communities. Overall, the data confirms that while the violations were primarily inflicted on individuals, families as a whole suffered systematic and severe consequences. This dual impact eroded family stability, undermined community trust, and weakened the socio-economic foundations of households, perpetuating cycles of trauma and vulnerability.


AWARENESS

Knowledge of TRRC

Figure presents the findings and shows that knowledge of the TRRC is generally high. Nationally, 23 per cent of respondents rated their knowledge as “Excellent,” 34 per cent as “Very Good,” and 38 per cent as “Good,” meaning over 95 per cent had at least a satisfactory understanding. Only 4 per cent rated their knowledge as “Poor,” and none indicated “Very Poor.”

Figure 6: Knowledge of TRRC





Regionally, the **Lower River Region (47%)** recorded the highest proportion of respondents reporting “Excellent” knowledge of the TRRC, followed closely by the Central River Region (North) at 42%. Other regions, such as the **West Coast (17%)**, **Greater Banjul Area (16%)**, and **North Bank Region (11%)**, lagged behind, indicating disparities in the depth of knowledge across the country.

At the same time, **very good knowledge** was most strongly reported in the **Central River Region (North) (51%)**, followed by the **Greater Banjul Area (42%)** and the **West Coast Region (42%)**. This suggests that in urban centres and certain rural areas, many respondents felt well-informed even if they did not classify their knowledge as “excellent.”

In the “Good” knowledge category, both the Upper River Region (49%) and Lower River Region (47%) stood out. Although these regions had fewer respondents reporting “Excellent” or “Very Good” knowledge, a significant number still considered themselves fairly well-informed about the TRRC’s activities. The Greater Banjul Area and West Coast had a smaller proportion of respondents rating their knowledge as excellent but a more substantial share in the “Good” category.

On the other end of the spectrum, **“Poor” knowledge ratings were relatively low across regions**, though the **Greater Banjul Area (26%)** and **Upper River Region (21%)** had comparatively higher figures. This may reflect urban-rural divides, where greater exposure to media coverage did not necessarily translate into a deeper understanding.

Interestingly, **“Very Poor” knowledge is negligible across all regions (0–1%)**, reinforcing the idea that almost everyone had at least some awareness of the TRRC process.

Overall, the TRRC achieved broad visibility and public understanding nationwide, but the depth of knowledge varied significantly. Regions like LRR and CRR (North) demonstrated the strongest comprehension, while urban centres like GBA showed mixed results — high shares

of very good knowledge alongside notable proportions of poor ratings. This suggests that while the TRRC’s outreach successfully reached diverse communities, ensuring equal levels of in-depth understanding remains a challenge, particularly in Greater Banjul and some peripheral regions.

Knowledge of Government White Paper

the findings on the knowledge of the Government White Paper, and it reveals that while a majority of respondents are aware of it, the depth of understanding is generally moderate. Nationally, the largest proportion of respondents (42%) rated their knowledge as “Good,” followed by 23% who described their knowledge as “Poor” and 21% who considered it “Very Good.” Only 7% of respondents reported having “Excellent” knowledge of the White Paper, while 8% indicated their understanding was “Very Poor.” This suggests that although awareness is fairly widespread, detailed comprehension is limited among many citizens.


When examining regional patterns, significant variations emerge. High levels of “Good” knowledge were recorded in the West Coast Region (65%), Greater Banjul Area (63%), and Central River Region South (51%). “Very Good” ratings were particularly high in the Central River Region North (62%) and Greater Banjul Area (26%), showing stronger familiarity in these areas. On the other hand, “Poor” knowledge ratings were notable in the Upper River Region (31%), West Coast Region (11%), and North Bank Region (11%), indicating weaker awareness in some communities. “Excellent” knowledge was generally low across all regions, with the highest proportions found in Central River Region North (20%) and Lower River Region (18%). Overall, the results suggest that while most respondents have heard about the Government White Paper, many do not have an in-depth understanding of its content or implications. The uneven distribution of knowledge across regions points to disparities in information access and public engagement. This highlights the need for targeted awareness and sensitisation campaigns, particularly in areas with lower levels of “Excellent” and “Very Good” ratings, to ensure that citizens are fully informed about the Government White Paper and its role in the transitional justice process.

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
Figure 7: Knowledge of the Government White Paper



Knowledge of White Paper implementation

Figure 8 presents the findings and indicates that public knowledge about the implementation of the Government White Paper is generally low. Over half of the respondents (53%) rated their knowledge as *poor*, while 16% reported it as *very poor*. Only a small fraction—1%—described their understanding as *excellent*, with 9% rating it as *very good* and 21% as *good*. At the regional level, poor knowledge was consistently high. The Greater Banjul Area (GBA) and West Coast Region (WCR) recorded the highest share of respondents with poor knowledge at 74% each, followed closely by Lower River Region (LRR) at 60% and Upper River Region (URR) at 66%. Central River Region (North) had 39% and CRR (South) 36% reporting poor knowledge, while the North Bank Region (NBR) had the lowest share of *poor* ratings at 45%, although this still represented nearly half of its respondents.

Figure 8: Knowledge of White Paper Implementation



Very few respondents in any region reported *excellent* knowledge—none in GBA, CRR (North), CRR (South), or URR. The highest *excellent* ratings were 5% in WCR and 4% in LRR. Notably, *very poor* ratings were significant in certain regions, such as CRR (South) at 51% and NBR at 45%, suggesting complete unfamiliarity with the implementation process among many residents.


Overall, these results point to a major awareness gap regarding how the White Paper recommendations are being implemented, with the majority of the population being either poorly informed or not informed at all. This low awareness could hinder public engagement and reduce trust in the transitional justice process.


NHRC OVERSIGHT MONITORING

Figure 9 indicates the findings on the knowledge about the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) oversight role and shows that awareness among respondents is generally high, with most rating their knowledge positively. At the national level, the majority (66%) of respondents rated their knowledge of NHRC oversight as “Good,” while 20% rated it as “Very Good” and 5% as “Excellent.” This means about 90% of respondents have at least a fair understanding of the NHRC’s role in overseeing the implementation of recommendations and protecting human rights. However, there remains a small proportion who rated their knowledge as “Poor” (7%) or “Very Poor” (3%), indicating some gaps in public awareness.

Regional variations are notable. The highest proportion of “Good” ratings was recorded in CRR South (83%), followed by WCR (80%), CRR North, NBR, and URR (all at 62%). GBA reported the lowest proportion of “Good” knowledge (53%), although this Region had the highest “Poor” rating (42%). In contrast, GBA also recorded a relatively high share of respondents rating their knowledge as “Very Good” or “Excellent,” suggesting that while some residents are highly informed, others remain significantly uninformed.

Figure 9: NHRC Oversight Monitoring






Interestingly, in most regions, “Good” was the dominant rating, with relatively low proportions of respondents describing their knowledge as “Poor” or “Very Poor.” This pattern suggests that awareness efforts about the NHRC’s role have been fairly effective, although disparities persist. These gaps may be partly explained by the study’s focus on reaching direct victims of human rights violations, while in some cases, indirect victims or family members were engaged due to the unavailability or passing of the primary victims. As a result, variations in firsthand knowledge and interaction with the NHRC could influence regional differences in responses.

Overall, the results highlight a generally positive public understanding of NHRC oversight function but also underscore the need for targeted awareness campaigns in regions like GBA, where the distribution of knowledge is more polarised, with both highly informed and significantly uninformed respondents present.

CSO OVERSIGHT MONITORING

Figure 10 indicates the findings on the knowledge of CSO oversight and reveals that the majority of respondents have a generally positive understanding, with varying degrees of depth across regions. Nationally, most respondents rated their knowledge as *Good* (57%), followed by *Very Good* (28%), while smaller proportions rated it as *Excellent* (8%), *Poor* (4%), and *Very Poor* (2%). This suggests that while awareness is high, there is room for improvement in moving more people from general to in-depth knowledge.

Figure 10: CSO Oversight Monitoring



The data reveal clear regional differences in the level of knowledge about CSO oversight. In **CRR South**, an overwhelming majority (81%) rated their knowledge as *Good*, while 11% rated it *Excellent*, the highest “Excellent” score across all regions. Similarly, both **WCR (54%)** and **NBR (61%)** recorded strong “Good” ratings, supported by notable proportions of *Very Good* ratings (25% in WCR and 33% in NBR). In the **Greater Banjul Area (GBA)**, responses were nearly split, with 53% rating their knowledge as *Good* and 47% rating it as *Poor*, indicating a more polarised perception.

On the other hand, some regions displayed lower levels of knowledge. **URR** recorded *Poor* ratings at 14%, while **LRR (3%)** and **CRR North (2%)** also had noticeable proportions of *Poor* responses. However, the share of *Very Poor* ratings remained minimal across all regions, suggesting that a complete lack of knowledge is rare. Overall, the results show that awareness of CSO oversight is relatively strong nationwide, particularly in CRR South, WCR, and NBR.

Nevertheless, gaps persist in URR and parts of LRR and CRR North, highlighting the need for targeted awareness and capacity-building efforts in these areas to ensure a more balanced understanding countrywide.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER


Figure 11 presents findings on the sources of information about the Government White Paper (WP). Radio is by far the most common channel, cited by 68% of respondents, underscoring its accessibility and influence nationwide. Civil society organisations (CSOs) follow closely at 58%, confirming their central role in public engagement and advocacy. Television also plays a significant role (43%), while social media is becoming increasingly important (39%), reflecting the growing digitalisation of information flows.


Beyond these, friends (29%) and the NHRC Report (22%) emerge as notable sources. While friends highlight informal peer-to-peer information-sharing, the NHRC's contribution reflects its institutional mandate to monitor, report, and raise awareness on the TRRC implementation and broader human rights issues.

Other sources, such as newspapers (12%), political parties (10%), religious leaders (4%), local leaders (3%), government sources (1%), and educational institutions (1%), play relatively minor roles in informing the public about the White Paper.

Overall, the data shows that while traditional media (radio, TV) and CSOs remain dominant in shaping awareness, the NHRC's reports are also serving as a significant channel for informing the public, second only to interpersonal networks like friends outside the mass media/CSO channels.

Figure 11: Sources of Information on Government WP





Disaggregating the data by region reveals important variations in how people access information about the Government White Paper (WP). Radio emerges as the most dominant source in most regions, particularly in the North Bank Region (NBR), West Coast Region (WCR), Central River ³Region North (CRR-N), Central River Region South (CRR-S) and Lower River Region (LRR). This underscores its status as the most accessible and trusted medium across the country.

At the same time, social media stands out as a key source of information in several regions, especially the Greater Banjul Area (GBA), WCR, LRR, and Upper River Region (URR). This pattern reflects the growing digital connectivity of both urban and rural communities and points to the increasing influence of online platforms in shaping public awareness.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) are particularly influential in LRR and CRR-South, where they play a leading role in public sensitisation. This shows that in some regions, CSOs have a stronger communication footprint than traditional media, underlining their importance as trusted intermediaries between government policy and citizens. NHRC reports also appear as a notable source in regions like NBR and CRR-North, suggesting that the Commission's publications are reaching communities where institutional information is otherwise limited. Friends and interpersonal networks play a significant role in regions such as NBR, where reliance on informal word-of-mouth channels complements other media. However, government sources remain negligible across all regions, contributing very little to direct awareness of the White Paper.

Overall, the findings suggest that while radio continues to dominate, social media and CSOs are gaining increasing prominence in both urban and rural contexts. This points to the need

³ Section 13(a), Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) Act, 2017, which mandates the Commission to "create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights from July 1994 to January 2017."

for a multi-channel communication strategy that leverages radio's reach, social media's growing penetration, and the grassroots presence of CSOs to ensure that information about transitional justice and government policies reaches all communities effectively.

Thematic Analysis on Awareness of TRRC & White Paper Implementation

The participants demonstrate specific knowledge of the contents of the Government White Paper and the Government's selective implementation. This question explored awareness of the White Paper and follow-up implementation steps.

The victims show a strong awareness of the historical context that led to the establishment of the TRRC. The respondents understand its core mandate: truth-telling, reconciliation, and reparations. The reference to "serious human rights violations" situates the TRRC as a transitional justice mechanism aimed at healing past abuses.¹

The victims understand the TRRC recommendations as advocacy tools and measures proposed by the TRRC for the State to act on in connection with various human rights violations presented through public testimonies. The respondents understand that the Implementation Plan is a structured process with timelines to successfully implement it, which covers diverse types of violations and is linked to specific deadlines. The respondents emphasise that the work of the Victim Centre currently focuses on popularising the TRRC recommendations and the Government White Paper so that both victims and the public "understand what has been recommended... and the timelines to implementing these recommendations." This, they believe, is essential in enabling victims' meaningful participation in implementation discussions.

The respondents also noted parallel mechanisms set up by the Government:

- i. A Reparations Commission to provide compensation to victims.
- ii. An accountability mechanism to prosecute "those who bear the highest responsibilities of crimes."
- iii. Support systems such as psychosocial assistance, medical care, and institutional reforms in security and prison services.

Thematic Analysis of Views on the Implementation on the Government White Paper on the TRRC Report and Recommendations

During the Focus Group Discussion, participants shared their views within the context of the Government's public pledge of an "unwavering commitment" to implement the TRRC recommendations for justice, accountability, non-repetition, institutional reforms, reconciliation and reparations. Participants were asked whether they had seen the Government or public officials take action regarding the implementation of the TRRC's Report and recommendations. They raised significant concerns about the implementation of the Government White Paper on the Report of the TRRC. The following are highlights of their deliberations in verbatim quotations: P4 argued that

"I can say that the Government has not taken any action to implement the recommendations. From the time the recommendations were made till now, nothing has been done. Some victims have even died. We tell those who are coming to meet with us that you might not have anyone to meet with in the future. If they had taken any actions, things would have been clear" (P4, FGD, Brikama, 2025).

Another participant said, *"if the Government was ready to take action, we would have seen it by now"* (P3, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025). Another participant said, *"the Government did not take any step when it comes to all the recommendations. The Government should discuss with us to let them know that these recommendations are not implemented, and they are supposed to be implemented"* (P1, FGD, Essau, 2025). Equally, P4 said *"I also did not see any action taken by the Government, the perpetrators are still in the Government, and it was recommended for those people to be sacked and that's not done"* (P4, FGD, Essau, 2025). P2 said, *"I will tell you one thing, there was a scenario, we were called for a meeting as victims and most of those victims were suffering by then and were promised to be compensated, but they have not been compensated to date"* (P2, FGD, Essau, 2025). P5 said, *"not to my knowledge. I am not aware of the implementation of any recommendations given to the Government by TRRC. So, in my opinion, the Government doesn't take any action. The Government does not have any achievements in this, and the White Paper should be called black paper instead because it doesn't have any success stories. A promise had been made, but still not fulfilled. We are dissatisfied with the Government about the implementation of TRRC recommendations"* (P5, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025),

2025). P6 said, *"From my point of view, the Government had no intention of taking any action about these recommendations for reasons known to them. "The Government should do something about compensation because I, for example, had been in prison for 9 years and was supposed to be compensated, but nothing meaningful has been done about it. And it's really hard to forgive because our lives have been ruined, so they should compensate us and prosecute the perpetrators as soon as possible. I was at the launch of the Government White Paper, and it has been three years now, and nothing is done about it"* (P6, FGD, Essau, 2025). P4 stated *"for me, we haven't seen any action from the Government; it is the CSOs that informed us of the Government White paper, but we haven't heard or seen action regarding new programs or reforms"* (P4, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025). P2 said, *"We only had a meeting with Ida and the team; we were engaged in how the implementations are going to be done, but no implementation of the recommendations was made"* (P4, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025). P5 and P6 opined that

"The Government promised to compensate us, the victims, but we are not satisfied with the work of the Government regarding that. We hardly have meetings with the Government, which is a drawback. "In my opinion, there's not much action taken by the Government regarding the implementation of TRRC's recommendations." While P6 said, "In my point of view, the Government did not try when it comes to implementing these recommendations of TRRC. The only thing that was done was the reconciliation process, and that was facilitated by the TRRC, not the Government. The TRRC invited us to their office and did


mediation for reconciliation among people who were victims and perpetrators in our village here” (P4, P6, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

TRUST IN TRRC PROCESS

Trust in Government Delivering Justice

Figure 12 reports the findings on trust in the Government’s justice delivery, showing a significant trust deficit among respondents. Nationally, only 31% of respondents believe that the Government will deliver justice, while a substantial 69% do not share this confidence. This indicates that the majority of the population is sceptical about the Government's commitment or capacity to ensure justice.

Figure 12: Trust in Government Delivery of Justice



Regional variations are also evident. In the Greater Banjul Area (GBA), an overwhelming 89% of respondents lack trust, with only 11% expressing confidence. Similarly, in the Central River Region (South), distrust reaches its highest level at 91%, and trust stands at a mere 9%. Other regions, such as Lower River Region (81% no, 19% yes) and Upper River Region (79% no, 21% yes), also reflect this pattern of high scepticism.


However, some LGAs show a more balanced view. In the Central River Region (North), distrust is 55% compared to 45% who trust the Government, suggesting a relatively higher level of optimism compared to other areas. The North Bank Region (NBR) also shows a smaller gap, with 58% expressing distrust and 44% trust.


Overall, the findings highlight a pressing need for the government to build credibility and public confidence in its justice delivery mechanisms. The widespread scepticism, particularly acute in urban and certain rural areas, suggests that without tangible reforms, transparency, and visible accountability, restoring public trust will remain a significant challenge.

Trust in NHRC Holding Government Accountable

Figure 13 reports the findings on public trust in the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to hold the government accountable and indicates a generally positive perception. Nationally, a significant majority of respondents (71%) agreed that they trust the NHRC in this role, with an additional 11% strongly agreeing. Only a small fraction expressed disagreement — 5% disagreed and 2% strongly disagreed — while 12% remained neutral.

Figure 13: Trust in NHRC Holding Government Accountable





When examined by LGAs, the results show that perceptions of the NHRC’s ability to hold the government accountable are largely positive, with *Agree* being the most common response across most areas. The strongest *Agree* ratings were found in **CRR North (79%)** and **WCR (75%)**, followed by **NBR and LRR (69% each)** and **CRR South (68%)**, while the **URR** recorded 64%. The proportion of respondents who *Strongly Agree* varied, with the highest recorded in **CRR South (21%)** and **URR (5%)**, but lower in **CRR North (3%)** and **LRR (2%)**.

In the **Greater Banjul Area (GBA)**, however, opinions were more divided. While 47% of respondents said they *Agree* with the NHRC’s role and 0% *Strongly Agree*, a significant 42% expressed *Neutrality*. Across other regions, negative responses (*Disagree* and *Strongly Disagree*) were present but relatively modest, ranging from 2% in **NBR** to 7% in **LRR**, while *Strongly Disagree* ratings remained minimal at 4% and 2%. *Neutral* responses were also limited, though more visible in **CRR North (15%)** and **WCR (14%)**. Overall, the findings indicate that the NHRC enjoys strong public trust nationwide, though the strength of that trust varies by region. Areas with higher disagreement or neutrality, particularly GBA and LRR, may require more visible engagement and demonstrable action to reinforce confidence in the institution’s accountability role.

FAIRNESS OF TRRC TO VICTIMS


Figure 14 reports the findings on perception of fairness to victims and indicates a generally high level of trust in the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission (TRRC) being fair to victims. At the national level, a combined **91%** of respondents expressed positive views, with **77% agreeing** and **14% strongly agreeing** that the TRRC was fair. Only a small minority—**5% neutral**, **3% disagree**, and **2% strongly disagree**—expressed scepticism or withheld judgment.


Regionally, perceptions of the TRRC’s fairness to victims varied but were overwhelmingly positive. In **CRR North**, trust was particularly strong, with **96% of respondents rating the TRRC’s fairness as “Agree”**, and no one selecting *Disagree* or *Strongly Disagree*. This indicates near-unanimous confidence in the TRRC’s fairness in that region. Similarly, both **WCR and NBR** recorded very high approval, with **81% of respondents agreeing**, and only small proportions offering neutral or negative views. These figures suggest a clear endorsement of the TRRC’s approach in those regions.

Positive perceptions were also evident in other areas, though slightly lower. In **GBA**, 58% of respondents *Agreed* and 32% *Strongly Agreed*, showing majority confidence but also a noticeable share of respondents leaning toward more cautious support. In **LRR**, 62% agreed while 28% strongly agreed, reflecting similarly strong but slightly more mixed views. Meanwhile, **CRR South (70% Agree, 21% Strongly Agree)** and **URR (67% Agree, 7% Strongly Agree)** also demonstrated solid trust, though with small shares of neutral or negative responses.

Overall, the findings suggest that the TRRC has been widely viewed as fair to victims across The Gambia, with **exceptionally high trust in CRR North, WCR, and NBR**, and generally strong approval elsewhere. The slightly more moderate ratings in urban centres like GBA highlight areas where perceptions could be further strengthened, but the overall picture points to broad national confidence in the Commission’s victim-centred approach.

Figure 14: Fairness of TRRC to Victims





Thematic Analysis on Perception of Trust, Fairness and Transparency

During focus group discussions, victims were asked how they would assess their trust and/or confidence level in the Government to implement the Government White Paper on TRRC's recommendations in a fair and transparent process. Participants were also asked whether they get honest information about what is happening and whether decisions have been explained to them regarding the implementation of the Government White Paper on TRRC's recommendations. In response to these questions, participants raised several divergent and/or similar concerns and argued that they did not have any trust in the Government about the implementation of the Government White Paper on TRRC's recommendations. They claim that since these recommendations were made, the Government has done nothing or made very little effort to implement them. Most participants assert that they have no trust or confidence that the TRRC's recommendations will be implemented properly and argued that the implementation process is not transparent because victims hardly get information about the implementation progress or setbacks. These assertions are corroborated by the following excerpts:

P1 states, *"I did not have any trust in the Government about the implementation of the White Paper. Since these recommendations were made, the Government has done nothing or made very little effort to implement the recommendations,"* while P2 asserts *"I have no trust that these recommendations will be implemented properly (...)"* (P1, P2, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025). P2 states *"the implementation of the TRRC's recommendations is not transparent, we do not have much information about it"* (P1, P2, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025). Furthermore, P2 states *"We do not believe that the Government will implement all the recommendations of the TRRC because the Government does not show any interest in it"* (P2, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025) while P6 relates *"for me, I did not have any confidence or trust that the Government will implement all these recommendations (...)"* (P2, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025); and P1 states *"the implementation of the Government White Paper on TRRC's recommendations are not transparent because we the victims hardly have information about the progress or setbacks"*

in the implementation process. We normally get information from the TRRC focal persons and other media outlets, but not from the Government” (P1, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025). In addition, P6 states “we don’t trust that the White Paper will be implemented” (P6, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025). However, participant P3 argued, “Yes, I have the trust that the Government will implement the TRRC recommendations” (P3, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarrol, 2025). These empirical findings show that more than **90% (most)** of the FGD participants in Jambur (WCR), Essau (NBR), Sintet (Foni Jarrol), and Brikamaba (CRR South) do not have trust and/or confidence in the Government to implement the Government White Paper on the TRRC’s recommendations in a fair and transparent process.

Participants were asked to rate the trust and/or confidence they have in the Government to implement the Government White Paper on TRRC’s recommendations in a fair and transparent process, **on a scale of 1-5, 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest**. In response to this question, participants rate it as follows:

P4 rates it 1 (one); P2 rates it (0) zero; P3 rates it 2 (two); P1 rates it 2 (two); P5 rates it 1 (one);

P6 rates it (0) zero (FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarrol, 2025), while in Essau (NBR), P2 rates it 4. In Brikamaba (CRR South), P3 rates it 3 (three), P4 rates it 0 (zero) and P5 rates it 3 (three). This is illustrated in the table below for a better understanding.

Location	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6	Notes
Sinet (Foni Jarrol, 2025)	2	0	2	1	1	0	FGD
Essau (NBR)	–	4	–	–	–	–	Only P2 rating given
Brikamaba (CRR South)	–	–	3	0	3	–	Ratings from P3, P4, P5

This demonstrates a **poor rating of the trust and/or confidence** participants have in the Government to implement the Government White Paper on the TRRC recommendations in a fair and transparent process.

SATISFACTION WITH THE TRRC PROCESS

Satisfaction with the TRRC Process

Figure 15 illustrates respondents' assessment of the data on satisfaction with prosecution. The data reveal that most respondents are dissatisfied with the progress in prosecuting individuals responsible for Jammeh-era human rights abuses. Over half of the respondents (52%) expressed “dissatisfaction”, and a further 14% were “very dissatisfied”. Only a small minority—1% “very satisfied” and 22% “satisfied”—felt positively about the progress, while 11% remained “neutral”.

Regionally, “dissatisfaction” is widespread, with particularly high levels in URR (71%), WCR (59%), CRR North (58%), and GBA (58%). Satisfaction levels are notably higher only in CRR South, where 60% of respondents expressed “satisfaction”. This pattern suggests that, overall, the public perceives the pace and effectiveness of prosecutions as “inadequate”, with very limited regions showing significant approval.

Figure 15: Satisfaction with Prosecution




SATISFACTION WITH REPARATIONS

The results on satisfaction with reparations indicate generally low approval of the progress made in providing compensation and assistance to victims of the past regime. Nationally, only 1% of respondents reported being *very satisfied* with the reparations process, while 19% said they were *satisfied*. A further 14% felt *neutral*. In contrast, dissatisfaction was high, with 56% of respondents expressing that they were *dissatisfied* and 10% saying they were *very dissatisfied*. This shows that two-thirds of the population of the victims were unhappy with the reparation efforts.

Regional data reflects similar trends, with dissatisfaction dominating across most areas. In the West Coast Region (WCR) and Lower River Region (LRR), dissatisfaction rates were 64% and 62% respectively. The Greater Banjul Area (GBA) had 58% dissatisfied respondents, while the Upper River Region (URR) recorded 59%. The Central River Region (North) and (South) showed slightly more mixed views, with dissatisfaction rates of 45% and 49% respectively, but CRR (North) also had a notably high “satisfied” response rate of 49%.

Overall, the findings highlight a widespread perception that the reparations process has been inadequate or slow, with many victims and communities feeling that their needs for compensation and assistance remain unmet. This dissatisfaction likely reflects gaps in implementation, delays in payments, or perceptions of unfair distribution.

Figure 16: Satisfaction with Reparation





SATISFACTION WITH SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The results show a generally negative perception of progress on Security Sector Reform (including the Police, Prisons, Gambia Armed Forces, SIS, DLEAG, and GID) as recommended by the TRRC.

Nationally, **56% of respondents reported being dissatisfied** with SSR progress, while **15% were very dissatisfied**. In contrast, satisfaction levels remain low, with only **1% very satisfied** and **18% satisfied**. About **10%** expressed neutrality.

Figure 17: Satisfaction with



Across regions, “dissatisfaction” dominates the responses. The **highest dissatisfaction** is recorded in LRR (**81%**), followed by URR (**64%**), CRR South (**62%**), and CRR North (**56%**). Even in regions with relatively lower dissatisfaction, such as WCR (**47%**) and NBR (**45%**), the negative perception still outweighs positive sentiment. Satisfaction is highest in CRR North (**40% satisfied**) and GBA (**21% satisfied**), though still far from outweighing dissatisfaction. These findings suggest that most citizens perceive SSR implementation as slow or ineffective, with regional variations but a consistently high level of disapproval nationwide. This could reflect concerns about accountability, transparency, and trust in the reformed security institutions.


SATISFACTION WITH JUDICIARY


The data on satisfaction with judicial reforms following the TRRC recommendations reveal a mixed yet predominantly critical public perception. Overall, only 1% of respondents indicated being *very satisfied*, while 33% expressed being *satisfied*. In contrast, dissatisfaction levels are notably high, with 40% reporting being *dissatisfied* and 13% being *very dissatisfied*. A further 13% remained neutral.

Regionally, dissatisfaction tends to dominate in most areas, particularly in CRR (North), where 52% reported being dissatisfied, and in WCR, with 48% dissatisfaction. GBA also shows a high proportion of dissatisfaction (42%), though it has one of the highest satisfaction rates at 37%. Notably, CRR (North) has a significant split between dissatisfaction (52%) and satisfaction (48%), indicating a polarised view of judicial reforms in that region.

The relatively low levels of strong satisfaction and the high proportion of dissatisfaction suggest that, for many Gambians, judicial reforms are perceived as insufficient, slow, or not meeting expectations. However, the notable satisfaction in some regions, like CRR (North) and GBA, points to localised variations that may be linked to differing regional experiences with the judiciary. This overall sentiment underscores the continued need for targeted, transparent, and effective reforms to rebuild public trust in the judicial system.

Figure 18: Overall and Regional Satisfaction with Judiciary






SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION

The findings indicate that satisfaction with the government’s implementation of the TRRC recommendations, as outlined in the White Paper, is generally low across the country. Nationally, only 1% of respondents reported being *very satisfied* and 19% *satisfied*, while 15% remained *neutral*. The majority expressed negative sentiments, with 52% *dissatisfied* and 13% *very dissatisfied*.

Regional data further shows that dissatisfaction dominates in all areas, though to varying degrees. The highest dissatisfaction levels were recorded in the Greater Banjul Area (74%), Upper River Region (70%), and Lower River Region (62%). Even in regions with relatively lower dissatisfaction, such as the Central River Region (South) (47%) and North Bank Region (36%), discontent still outweighed satisfaction. Satisfaction was highest in CRR (North), where 57% were satisfied, although 38% reported dissatisfaction. Neutral responses were more common in regions such as LRR (8%) and NBR (15%), suggesting a small segment of the population remains undecided.

Overall, the data suggest a widespread perception that government efforts to implement the TRRC recommendations have been insufficient, with limited regional variation in the general trend of disapproval. The consistently high dissatisfaction rates indicate that, for most citizens, expectations regarding justice, reforms, and accountability remain unmet.

Figure 19: Satisfaction with Government Implementation



Thematic analysis of satisfaction with prosecution

Victims voiced out their opinions and raised numerous concerns and issues about the non-prosecution of perpetrators and the Government allowing these perpetrators to remain working in the system. Victims argued that a major source of concern was prosecution, where victims who suffered violations and abuses have not seen their perpetrators prosecuted. The respondents articulated their experiences in the following statements:

“You know, for us to do this is left with the Government, but the Government supported the perpetrators over us because the Government allowed them to still be working in the system. If those people are prosecuted, we will at least be certain that justice will prevail, but the Government protects those people better than the victims” (P2, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“If the Government did what it was supposed to do, we would have forgotten all these things because we are all Muslims and are ready to forgive. The security guy that arrested me even came to me one day with fifty dalasi to seek forgiveness from me, and I refused by rejecting the money because the Government refused to do what it was supposed to do, and I will not forgive until the Government does what it is supposed to do” (P3, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“We the victims are not going to give up until the Government does what is supposed to be done. Even if we are going to continue begging, we will until we have what we want” (P5, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“For prosecution, I even made these recommendations at TRRC when I was invited there as a witness. I made it clear that the perpetrators should be prosecuted before we talk about apology and reconciliation. We cannot forgive when we see the perpetrators not being prosecuted or held accountable for the horrific crimes they have committed. About reparations, there can’t be any reparations when the perpetrators are still working in the Government” (P1, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“I also support the idea of prosecution first before reparations”, while P6 argues “even God will not forgive if you commit a sin and never repent. In this case, the perpetrators are in fact given bigger positions in the Government instead of being prosecuted or held accountable” (P3, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“For what I know in The Gambia, no action has been taken against anyone, only those out of the country are taken to court and prosecuted”, and “In this country I have not seen any action taken against anyone” (P2, P3, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarrol, 2025).

“Everyone who has been recommended by the TRRC in the Government White Paper that should be prosecuted must be brought before justice. And those who were supposed to be sacked or dismissed must be fired from their workplaces; if not, there are no institutional reforms. And there are no changes in the legal reform. We want a new constitution” (P4, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

The rest of the victims raised similar concerns and issues as P1, P2, P3, and P4 did regarding the prosecution of perpetrators.

Thematic analysis of satisfaction with reparation

This sub-theme reveals a generally high level of discontentment among victims regarding issues of reparations and gaps in the delivery of reparations (money, land, services, and memorials). Victims voiced out their frustrations with the pace and efficiency of implementation of the TRRC’s recommendations regarding reparations, citing inadequate communication between the Government and victims on issues of reparations. Most of the victims expressed disappointment and dissatisfaction with the reparation process. The respondents enunciated their experiences in the following verbatim quotations:

“There is no clear communication between us and the Government about these things” (P1, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“Essa Faal, the Lead Counsel of TRRC, had helped some of us, the victims, with compensation; he would sometimes buy bags of rice, sugar and other things for us. But the Government did not, to the best of my knowledge” (P3, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“We have had meetings and compensations were given by TRRC, but not everyone was compensated” (P4, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“Reparations can come later; prosecution should be the first step by the Government, but seeing those people (perpetrators) still working in the Government again is traumatising” (P2, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

Another participant states, “For us here, TRRC gave us the first reparation money, and they said the rest would be given by the Government, but we are yet to receive that from the Government. Apart from that, none of the other deliverables have been given to any of us” (P2, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarrol, 2025).

“Those that came are many, but the only services offered for now are the medical/health treatment services” (P3, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarrol, 2025).

“Victims who should have reparation, such as medical treatment, the Government should ensure that they receive medical care” (P1, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarrol, 2025).

“The Government has made a promise to provide reparations, but honestly, most of the victims are dissatisfied with it. We, the victims, experience disappointment with the process now” (P4, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

“What I know is that some of the victims were given compensation after the recommendations, but most of the victims didn’t receive any financial support from anyone, including the Government” (P6, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

Thematic analysis of satisfaction with security sector reforms

During focus group discussions, victims were asked to describe the changes they see in institutions (such as the Police, Army, Courts, SIS, Prisons) regarding the TRRC’s recommendations. In response to this question, participants raised several divergent and/or similar concerns and argued that the Government has been talking about Security Sector Reforms, among others, but they couldn’t do it. The victims claimed that there are not many reforms or changes, especially in the security sector, including the Army, SIS, Prisons and the justice system, while others cite that, in their opinions, there is little positive change in the security sector, although there is more room for improvement. Some victims opined and alleged that there are no reforms in the Police because people are being arrested unlawfully, and perpetrators of crimes and abuse are still operating in the security system. This is corroborated by the following verbatim quotations from the respondents:

“There is not much change in the security sector. The guy who shot the police is going in the right direction. So in my opinion, this shows that there is positive change in the justice system, although there is more room for improvement” (P2, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“There is no change in our security sector, no security reform, the Government only promised but did not do it” (P3, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“About security sector reform, the police are supposed to be fair, and the justice system should be fair, and that is what the laws say, but the law is not followed in these cases” (P4, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“In my opinion, I think there is no reform in the police because they are still arresting people unlawfully. For the army, SIS, and the justice system, there are little changes (...)” (P2, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“In the security sector, especially in the army, (...) nothing is done, up till now we have perpetrators in the army; some were suspended, but others are still there. On the other hand, I blame the TRRC. Since the onset of TRRC, they should have allowed the victims to be part of the investigative team. Some victims were not interviewed, and their relatives did not come to TRRC. We can forgive, but that will not be possible until the Government implements the TRRC’s recommendations” (P6, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“With regards to the security sector reform, some of the military and police and other security sector employees should be sacked/fired, especially those who have participated in human rights violations” (P5, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

“Well, after the change of Government, we were told that institutional reforms would happen, but for me it’s still the same. Because the people who committed these atrocities are the very ones still working in the security sector” (P2, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

“Some of these people we meet all the time and are the reasons people like me don’t have a proper meal. What they have done to my husband has ended up taking his life, and since then, life has been very hard for me and my family. These people should be brought to justice or even be removed from their position” (P3, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

“Like P2 just said, these are the same people the Government is working with, and they are all doing politics together. So, the people who should be charged and brought to justice are the ones who hold higher positions in the security sector. So, we the victims are not happy about it, but I am also not sure we can do much about it” (P5, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

FORMS OF REPARATIONS


Victim Centered Reparations


The findings indicate that the majority of respondents (67%) agree that the process of providing reparations has been centred on victims' needs, reflecting a generally positive perception of victim-centred justice. However, a notable minority—15%—disagree, while 18% remain uncertain.

Disaggregated by region, the belief that the reparation process employed a victim-centred approach is strongest in CRR North, where an overwhelming 94% agree, followed closely by CRR South (77%), NBR (76%), and LRR (72%). URR shows moderate agreement (55%), while the lowest positive responses are recorded in GBA (26%) and WCR (51%). Interestingly, GBA has the highest proportion of respondents who feel the process has not been victim-focused (42%), whereas WCR stands out for its high share of “don't know” responses (41%), indicating significant uncertainty in that region.

Overall, while the national outlook suggests broad approval of a victim-focused reparations process, regional variations highlight areas—particularly GBA and WCR—where perceptions are more divided or uncertain, suggesting the need for improved communication, transparency, and engagement with victims in those communities.

Figure 20: Victim-Centered Reparation







FORMS OF REPARATION

The charts show that financial compensation is overwhelmingly seen as the most important form of reparation, with 98% of respondents prioritising it. Other widely supported forms include medical assistance (55%), scholarships (52%), and housing (48%), suggesting that victims value both immediate financial relief and long-term socio-economic support. Apology (42%) also holds significance, indicating that symbolic gestures of acknowledgement matter alongside material aid. Memorials (29%) and legal support (30%) receive less emphasis overall, though they remain relevant for certain groups.

Figure 19: Form of Reparation





Regionally, the preference for financial reparation is consistent across all areas, but there is variation in secondary priorities — for instance, some regions place greater emphasis on housing or medical assistance, while others lean towards educational support or memorials. This shows a broad consensus on the need for tangible, livelihood-focused reparations, complemented by restorative and symbolic measures.

Thematic Analysis of Needs of Victims in Terms of Apology, Compensation or Support Services

The victims argued that the TRRC gave them the first compensation, but the Government hasn't done anything since then; no steps have been taken by the Government in terms of compensation or support services. The respondents claim that although they did not receive any compensation or support, Government officials went to them to seek an apology and reconciliation. They further expressed that Foni has not had any benefits from the implementation of these recommendations, except for some of the victims who were sick and were treated by the Victim Centre. These are substantiated by the following quotations: "It was the TRRC that gave us the first compensation, but the Government hasn't done anything for now", while the other participant said, "no step from the Government in terms of compensation or support services" (P1, P6, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025).

"There was no compensation support, the Government officials were only here to seek apology and reconciliation, but no compensation" (P1, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

"The community does not get any benefits from the implementation of these recommendations, except that some of the victims who were sick in this community were treated by the Victim Centre. Apart from that, there's not much benefit gained by the community from the Victim Centre" (P5, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“The reason why all these are happening is because of what happened in the past. So, there should be prosecution before we talk about apology or reparations” (P6, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“When it comes to reparations and compensation, the Government has not done anything about that. Promises were made, but still nothing” (P1, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

“I know that support service and apology are all important and necessary, but at the moment, victims need financial support; we are going through a lot, and most of us don’t have support. Because I personally have lost my husband, and it’s me and my co-wife, and trust is even becoming an issue for us because she is thinking that the victims were given reparations, which has not happened” (P3, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).


“They did not do anything in all these aspects. It is only WAVE that gave us support, and I see that the Government is not even ready to do anything about this issue, and we, the victims, even want to give up because we are tired of all these activities” (P2, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025). The rest of the victims raised similar concerns and issues as P1, P2, P3 and P4 regarding apology, compensation or support services.


GENDER NEEDS AND INCLUSION

Gender Needs Addressed

The data shows that a majority of respondents believe that the needs of women and girls — particularly victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence—have been addressed in the TRRC Implementation Plan, but there are important nuances. Nationally, **67% agree** and **4% strongly agree** that gender-specific needs have been adequately addressed, while **8% (7% disagree + 1% strongly disagree)** express dissatisfaction, and **20% remain neutral**.

Figure 20: Gender Needs Addressed





From a regional perspective, agreement levels are especially high in **NBR (89%)**, **CRR North (90%)**, and **CRR South (74%)**, while lower in **GBA (21%)** and **URR (58%)**, suggesting some urban and eastern region respondents are less convinced. Neutral responses are also relatively high in GBA (47) and URR (37%), indicating uncertainty or mixed perceptions in these areas.

This suggests that while the national picture is largely positive, there is still a need for stronger communication, community engagement, and possibly more tailored interventions in regions where confidence is lower or neutrality is high, especially in urban areas where expectations for policy delivery may be more stringent.

YOUTH NEEDS


The findings indicate that a majority of respondents believe the Implementation Plan of the White Paper on the TRRC Report has adequately addressed the needs of youth and young people. Overall, 64% of respondents agreed, with an additional 5% strongly agreeing, making a total agreement of nearly 70%. This suggests that, in general, the TRRC's proposed measures are seen as responsive to youth-related concerns, which may include education, skills training, employment opportunities, and psychosocial support.

Regional data, however, reveal important variations in perception. The highest levels of agreement were recorded in the Lower River Region (LRR) at 87%, followed by CRR North (81%) and CRR South (77%). These high scores may reflect targeted outreach or specific initiatives in these areas that have resonated well with young people and local communities. In contrast, agreement levels in the West Coast Region (WCR) and Upper River Region (URR) were lower, 54% and 58% respectively. This could point to gaps in implementation, communication, or region-specific needs that are not yet fully addressed.

Despite the overall positive outlook, there is a significant proportion of respondents who are uncertain or critical of the plan's youth provisions. About 22% remained neutral, which may indicate limited awareness or understanding of the measures being proposed. Furthermore, 9% disagreed and 1% strongly disagreed, showing that some segments of the population still feel the implementation approach of the TRRC White Paper has shortcomings when it comes to adequately addressing the realities faced by young people.

The data suggest that while youth-related needs are being addressed in principle, there is a need for more regionally tailored interventions, stronger communication about specific youth-targeted programs, and mechanisms to ensure that these commitments translate into tangible improvements in education, employment, and empowerment for young people across all regions.



Figure 21: Youth Needs Addressed



PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (PWD) NEEDS ADDRESSED

The findings from the survey indicate that the majority of respondents believe that the needs of persons with disabilities (PWDs) have been adequately addressed in the Implementation Plan of the White Paper on the Report of the TRRC. Overall, 64% of participants agreed with the statement “The needs of persons with disabilities (PWDs) have been adequately addressed in the Implementation Plan of the White Paper on the Report of the TRRC”, while a further 5% strongly agreed. This shows a generally positive perception of the inclusion of PWD concerns in the Plan. However, a notable 22% of respondents remained neutral, suggesting uncertainty or limited awareness about the specific measures in place. A smaller proportion, 9%, disagreed, and 1% strongly disagreed, reflecting relatively low levels of outright dissatisfaction.

Figure 21: PWD Needs Addressed



The regional analysis reveals variations in perceptions. The highest levels of agreement were found in CRR North (87%), NBR (81%), and CRR South (77%), indicating strong confidence in the way the needs of PWD have been integrated in these areas. LRR recorded 49% agreement, while GBA (11%), WCR (54%), and URR (55%) showed moderate agreement levels. These latter regions also recorded higher neutral responses, with LRR and URR both having 37% of respondents uncertain about the adequacy of the measures for PWDs. Disagreement was more visible in GBA (32%) and WCR (18%), suggesting that respondents in these areas perceive gaps or shortcomings in the plan's inclusivity.

In summary, while the national picture shows a generally positive assessment of how the needs of PWDs are addressed, the regional disparities suggest uneven experiences in implementation or awareness. Regions with high agreement rates may benefit from more effective local engagement and service delivery, while those with higher neutrality or disagreement may require targeted interventions, awareness campaigns, or strengthened local mechanisms to ensure that PWDs fully benefit from the measures outlined in the TRRC Implementation Plan.

Thematic Analysis of Inclusion of Victims and Marginalized Groups

During FGDs, participants were asked how they would assess the inclusion of, and consultation with, victims in the process of implementing the Government White Paper on the Report of the TRRC. They were also asked whether or not they received any support or counselling services from the Government. Equally, victims were asked to describe any community-level reconciliation activities (e.g., memorial ceremonies, truth-telling events, local peace-building meetings) that are being undertaken by the Government. In response to these questions, various views and concerns were voiced:

Victims indicated that they are not included in the implementation process and that they only hear it from other sources, like interviewers/data collectors or the Victim Centre, etc., but not from the Government. The respondents stressed that they did not feel included in the activities of the Government, but affirmed that there were community reconciliation activities which were facilitated by the TRRC. They claimed that so far, the Government has not done any reconciliation activities in their communities. These claims are corroborated by the following statements of the FGD participants:

“We as victims did not feel included in the activities of the Government” (P4, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“We are not included in this implementation. We only hear it from other sources like you people who are doing interviews with us or the Victim Centre, etc., but not from the Government” (P6, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“There was community reconciliation through TRRC. This was facilitated by the TRRC, not the Government. The Government so far has not done any reconciliation activities in our community here” (P2, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

Furthermore, victims were asked to assess, in general, how they would evaluate the inclusion of marginalised groups (poor, different ethnic groups, PWDs, etc.) in public life since the TRRC. In response to this question, participants raised some major concerns which are similar and/or divergent in nature. Most of the respondents argue that they were not included, while two confirm that they were included in public life since the TRRC, and one was not sure whether all these minority groups were included or not. These assertions are supported by the following statements:

“Yes, persons with disabilities were included” (P1, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“For us here, the marginalised or the affected ethnic groups were not included, and among us as a community, the process is very poor and slow” (P4, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025).

“The Government does not make any efforts about community reconciliation. So, some of us victims are still being victimised by our own community members” (P4, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“I am not sure all these minority groups are included” (P6, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025).

“For me personally, I have attended a lot of meetings regarding the White Paper and the recommendations made by the TRRC, but there has never been a day when we were told about the implementation process and the way it’s going” (P6, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

Thematic Analysis of Needs of Women, Affected Communities

FGD participants were asked how they would assess the steps or actions the Government has taken so far to address the needs of women victims in terms of SGBV. Women victims voiced out several similar concerns and issues, including what they described as the Government’s inaction and empty promises, which are evidenced by the following verbatim quotations:

“For me, no action has been taken by the Government yet; it is only empty promises, and we want to see actions” (P3, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025),

“For me, nothing has been done in that regard, you heard it here, the woman said she was five months pregnant when she was taken, and nothing has been done yet” (P4, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025),

“The Government has not taken any action on women victims of SGBV. Because there is a lady here who was sexually violated, and still, she does not have any justice or support from the Government. This is one of the reasons why some of the victims have turned out to be opposition because they feel like the Government is not ready to take any action” (P6, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

Under the theme of addressing the needs of affected communities, respondents noted that no concrete steps or actions have been taken by the Government; rather, only civil society organisations (CSOs) have conducted advocacy initiatives. Participants stated that they were

aware of committees being set up at the community level to coordinate victim-related activities, but these were largely driven by CSOs and other interested agencies, not by the Government. They acknowledged that the Victim Centre carried out consultations but emphasised that the Government itself had taken no direct action. Victims further highlighted that there has been no community-level apology or compensation from the Government, although some reconciliation efforts took place, facilitated by the TRRC. Respondents stressed that “the Government so far has not done any reconciliation activities in our community here.” Some also mentioned ongoing health challenges, noting that they are required to seek overseas treatment but received no support from the Government. The following verbatim quotations support these assertions:

“No steps or actions from the Government, only the CSOs that come for advocacy” (P6, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025).

“We know that committees are being set up at the community level to coordinate activities regarding the victims, the Government and other agencies that have an interest in the plight of victims” (P5, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

“The Victim Centre did consultations, the Government has not done anything about this, no community-level apology or compensation” (P1, FGD, Essau, 2025).

“I was sick and supposed to go for overseas treatment, and I still did not have support from the Government” (P6, FGD, Essau, 2025).

“There was community reconciliation through the TRRC. This was facilitated by the TRRC, not the Government. The Government so far has not done any reconciliation activities in our community here” (P2, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“The CSOs and other groups that conduct advocacy are the ones that inform us of the activities, but none of the above reconciliation events have taken place here” (P4, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025).

“Like we said, apart from the CSOs, we didn’t have anything to call community level reconciliation, truth-telling or any other. What we want now is for the victim centre to come here so that we can have a conversation with them” (P5, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

PARTICIPATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TRRC PROCESS

Personal Participation in TRRC Engagement


The data shows that a large majority of respondents—83%—indicated they had personally participated in community meetings, workshops, or public consultations about the TRRC report or its implementation, while only 17% reported no participation. This suggests that there was generally high engagement in TRRC-related activities across the surveyed population.

When broken down by region, the findings reveal interesting variations. Regions such as CRR (North) and LRR recorded the highest participation rates at 96% and 94%, respectively, with only a small fraction of respondents in these areas reporting non-participation. WCR also recorded strong engagement levels at 90%, followed by URR at 82% and NBR at 70%. CRR (South) had a moderate level of participation (57%), showing a relatively balanced distribution between those who participated (57%) and those who did not (43%).

In contrast, GBA stands out as the only region with low participation, where just 26% of respondents reported engagement, compared to a substantial 74% who did not participate. This may suggest either limited outreach, logistical barriers, or lower community interest in that region's TRRC-related events.

Overall, the findings indicate that while the TRRC process succeeded in engaging a majority of the population in most regions, there were notable disparities, particularly in GBA, where engagement was significantly lower than elsewhere. This uneven participation could have implications for how well the TRRC's recommendations are understood, accepted, and implemented across the country.


Figure 22: Personal Engagement in TRRC Engagement



VICTIMS VOICES REPRESENTED

The data suggests that a significant proportion of respondents feel that victims have had a genuine voice in the TRRC process, though there are notable variations by region. Nationally, 60% of respondents agreed that victims' voices were represented, with an additional 8% strongly agreeing. This shows that more than two-thirds of the surveyed population expressed a positive perception of victim participation in the process. However, 18% disagreed and 3% strongly disagreed, indicating that a notable minority remain sceptical. Meanwhile, 11% remained neutral, which may suggest either limited knowledge or mixed views on the matter.

Figure 23: Victim Voices Represented



Disaggregated by region, the North Bank Region (NBR) recorded the highest agreement levels, with 82% agreeing and only 1% strongly disagreeing. Similarly, the Central River Region (North) also had high agreement (74%) and very low disagreement, suggesting strong confidence in victim representation. In contrast, Lower River Region (LRR) showed a more divided perspective, with 27% agreeing but a relatively high 47% disagreeing—pointing to regional disparities in how inclusive the process is perceived. Greater Banjul Area (GBA) also reflected mixed views, with 47% agreeing but 26% disagreeing, possibly reflecting more critical urban perspectives.

Overall, while the majority believe victims' voices have been considered, the regional differences highlight the importance of ensuring equal and meaningful participation across the country. The relatively high disagreement in certain areas suggests that more needs to be done to build trust and ensure consistent engagement of victims nationwide.

JUSTICE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT


Interaction with Justice Sector

The findings indicate that a large majority of respondents have not had direct interaction with justice sector actors regarding their cases or the TRRC process. Nationally, only 21% of victims or their family members reported engagement with actors such as police, lawyers, prosecutors, or judges, while 79% said they had no such contact.

At the regional level, there are significant variations. The highest levels of reported engagement are in the West Coast Region (31%) and the North Bank Region (31%), suggesting relatively better access or outreach in these areas. Central River Region (South) also shows some degree of interaction, with 21% indicating engagement. In contrast, engagement is extremely low in regions such as Lower River Region (8%), Central River Region (North) (2%), and Upper River Region (18%), with these areas showing overwhelming majorities reporting no contact with justice sector institutions (over 80% in each).

The low overall engagement levels point to a possible gap in victim support, outreach, or accessibility of justice institutions, particularly in rural and remote areas. This could limit victims' ability to pursue justice, seek information, or contribute meaningfully to accountability processes following the TRRC's work. It also suggests that while the TRRC process may have raised awareness about past abuses, the follow-up interactions with formal justice mechanisms remain limited for most victims.


Figure 23: Interaction with Justice Sector



Satisfaction with Justice Engagement

The data indicate a generally positive perception of justice sector engagement among the minority (21%) of respondents who reported having interactions with justice sector actors, but with notable levels of dissatisfaction. Within this group, nearly half (48%) said they were satisfied with the respect and dignity shown to them, while 6% reported being very satisfied and 4% were neutral. However, dissatisfaction was also significant: 38% said they were dissatisfied, and 3% were very dissatisfied. This suggests that while many victims who engaged with justice institutions had positive experiences, a considerable share felt their treatment fell short of expectations.

Figure 24: Satisfaction with Justice Engagement



Regional variations are notable. In the **West Coast Region (WCR)**, dissatisfaction was highest at 27%, while the **North Bank Region (NBR)** recorded the strongest satisfaction levels, with 24% “strongly agreeing” they were treated with respect and dignity. Regions like **Lower River Region (LRR)** and **Central River Region (North)** reported lower levels of strong satisfaction, with responses more evenly distributed across categories. Interestingly, the **Central River Region (South)** showed relatively higher levels of strong dissatisfaction (15%) compared to other regions, indicating a more strained relationship between victims and justice sector actors there.

Overall, while a majority of those who interacted with justice sector actors expressed a positive experience, the presence of significant dissatisfaction—particularly in certain regions—points to a need for more consistent standards in victim engagement, ensuring respect and dignity are upheld universally across the country.

Extent to which Victims Perspectives were Heard and Considered


The findings suggest that while some victims felt their voices were acknowledged within the TRRC process, many experienced only limited recognition. Half of the respondents (50%) reported that their voices were heard “to some extent,” meaning they had opportunities to share their stories or concerns—such as through hearings, consultations, or surveys—but felt these contributions were not always taken seriously or acted upon. Only 8% felt their voices were heard “to a great extent,” indicating that meaningful influence on key outcomes such as reparations, institutional reforms, or accountability measures was relatively rare. This highlights that although victim participation was present, it often remained partial or symbolic rather than fully empowering or meaningful.

Conversely, a significant proportion of victims reported limited influence in the TRRC process. About 24% felt their views were heard “a little,” and 16% said they were “not at all” considered, suggesting that for many respondents, participation felt more procedural than genuinely participatory. In other words, while they may have been given space to speak, they did not feel that their perspectives shaped outcomes such as truth-telling, reparations design, or follow-up reforms. A small number (2%) were unsure, pointing to possible gaps in communication about how victim input was considered.

Regional differences are evident in perceptions of whether victims’ voices were heard. The **West Coast Region (WCR)** recorded the highest share of dissatisfaction, with **27% of respondents stating only “some extent”**, suggesting that many felt excluded or only partially engaged in decision-making processes. The **Central River Region (South)** showed the highest proportion (**17%**) who believed their voice was heard to *a great extent*, but it also reflected mixed results, indicating a divide in experiences of participation. By contrast, **NBR (16%)** and **URR (12%)** displayed relatively stronger positive perceptions, with more respondents acknowledging that their voices were considered.

Overall, the data suggests that while some victims report meaningful participation, significant portions—particularly in **WCR**—continue to feel that their perspectives are undervalued or only marginally included. These disparities lead to uneven levels of engagement across the regions. To strengthen confidence in transitional justice processes, there is a need for **broader outreach, more consistent communication, and stronger mechanisms to demonstrate that victims’ input directly influences outcomes.**

Figure 24: Extent of Victims' Voice Heard



Thematic Analysis of Justice and Legal Reforms

Victims expressed their views and raised several concerns and issues surrounding their need for justice, legal reforms and the broader principle of accountability in transitional justice. They argued that many victims who experienced violations and abuse during the Jammeh regime are yet to get justice because perpetrators are not prosecuted for the crimes, violations and abuse they committed, which is regarded as a major concern. The respondents enunciated their experiences in the following excerpts:

P2 states, “the Government did not take any action against the people accused of abuses and crimes. There is no change, hence the country is still being governed by Jammeh regime laws (...)”; P1 claims “the justice system cannot change if the laws which is our supreme authority gives more power to the Government than the governed, nothing positive can happen in terms of change”; P4 claims “there is no change, the Government did not do anything to those perpetrators”; P1 states “the 1997 Constitution which is Jammeh regime Constitution is what is governing us (...)”; another participant argues “the laws during the Jammeh regime are the same laws in existence (...)”. The reason why the Government rejected the 2020 Draft Constitution is that it doesn’t give any power to the Government, and that’s the constitution we want as citizens” (P2, P1, P4, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

P4 postulates “I want to say that the perpetrators who committed these atrocities against us, the victims, are freely living their lives, while the Government did not take any action against them. In the next world, the Government or perpetrators will be held accountable for crimes, violations and abuse. The stress victims are going through can even kill because the Government is not doing anything to the perpetrators” (P4, FGD, Essau, NBR, 2025). P2 states, “the people who are working in the justice system must uphold the principle of transparency and accountability in their work. We should make sure we eliminate bribery and corruption in the justice system” (P4, FGD, Brikamaba, CRR South, 2025).

Thematic Analysis of Institutional Reforms

During focus group discussions, victims were asked about the changes they see in institutions (such as the Police, Army, Courts, SIS, Prisons) that the TRRC made recommendations about. In response to this question, participants raised several divergent and/or similar concerns and argued that the Government has not done much work in institutional and legal reforms. The victims claimed that there have not been many reforms or changes in the security sector, including the Army, SIS, Prisons and the justice system, while some claim that there is little positive change in the justice system, although there is more room for improvement. Some victims opined and alleged that there are no reforms in the Police because they are still arresting people unlawfully, and argued that perpetrators of crimes and abuse are still operating in the security system. This is substantiated with the following verbatim quotations from the victim respondents:



P5 states that “(...) long since the Government has been talking about legal reforms, but they have not done it,” while P2 said, “At least some things are moving, but slowly. We hear about bills being passed, but we don’t feel the difference in our lives yet” (P5, P2, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

P6 posits that “the point about reform, we have those that were victimised and those that were not, but we still have the perpetrators in the security system” (P6, FGD, Essau, 2025). P3 states “we have not seen any changes only one thing impresses me, that is, the TRRC came here and said any one who is sick should inform them for treatment; P1 says “no changes in all these institutions”; P3 states “no changes has been made”; and P4 claims “for me I have observed little changes with the police due to their public behavior compared to the Jammeh era security situation” (P1, P3, P4, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarrol, 2025).

Has the Government made enough outreach?

The findings reveal a strong perception among respondents that the government has not done enough outreach and communication to keep victims and victim-led organisations informed about the implementation of the Government White Paper on the Report of the TRRC. Nationally, 58% of respondents disagreed with the statement “The Government has adequately communicated and conducted outreach to victims and victim-led organisations regarding the implementation of the White Paper”, with an additional 12% strongly disagreeing. This means that almost 7 in 10 respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the level of outreach. Only a small minority — 11% agreeing and 5% strongly agreeing — felt the government’s outreach was sufficient, while 15% remained neutral.

Figure 25: Government made Enough Outreach



The regional breakdown further highlights variations in perception. Disagreement with the statement was particularly high in the Central River Region North (CRR North) at 86%, and the Greater Banjul Area (GBA) at 74%. Western Coast Region (WCR) and Lower River Region (LRR) also recorded high dissatisfaction levels at 56% and 60% respectively. In contrast, levels of agreement remained low across all regions, with the highest being just 14% in the North Bank Region (NBR). Neutral responses tended to be slightly higher in some regions, such as NBR (14%), possibly indicating some uncertainty or lack of information among respondents.

These results suggest a widespread sentiment that the government's communication and outreach strategies have fallen short of expectations, particularly in ensuring victims and their representatives are consistently informed about progress on TRRC recommendations. The very high levels of dissatisfaction in multiple regions indicate a significant gap in victim engagement, which, if unaddressed, could weaken trust in the implementation process and reduce public confidence in transitional justice efforts.



Perception of NHRC outreach on TRRC White Paper Implementation

The findings reveal a strong positive perception of the NHRC's outreach and communication efforts regarding the implementation of the Government White Paper on the TRRC report. Nationally, 70% of respondents "agreed" and a further 7% "strongly agreed" that the NHRC had done enough outreach to keep victims and victim-led organisations informed. Only a small proportion of respondents (6%) "disagreed" and 1% "strongly disagreed", while 16% remained "neutral".

Regional variations show consistently high agreement levels across the country. CRR (South) recorded the highest proportion of agreement at 87%, followed by NBR (81%) and LRR (73%). WCR (68%) and CRR (North) (62%) also reported strong positive sentiment. Even in regions with relatively lower agreement levels, such as URR (49% agree, 42% neutral) and GBA (37% disagree, 32% agree), the majority still endorsed the NHRC's outreach efforts.

This overwhelmingly positive feedback contrasts sharply with the more critical views expressed about the government's outreach in the previous question. It suggests that the NHRC has been more effective in engaging with victims and relevant organisations, possibly through more consistent communication, targeted outreach strategies, and a stronger on-the-ground presence. The data indicate that the NHRC has earned considerable trust among stakeholders, with its communication efforts perceived as both sufficient and impactful across nearly all regions.

Figure 26: NHRC Enough Outreach



Perception of CSO outreach on TRRC White Paper Implementation

The data on Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) indicates that, overall, they are perceived as having done substantial outreach and communication to keep victims and victim-led organisations informed about the implementation of the Government White Paper on the TRRC report.


At the national level, the majority of respondents **agree** (71%) with the statement, and an additional **18% strongly agree**, giving a combined **89% positive perception**. Only a small fraction expressed disagreement (**3% disagree** and **1% strongly disagree**), while **6% remained neutral**. This overwhelmingly positive response suggests that CSOs are widely trusted and recognised for their role in bridging the communication gap between the transitional justice process and affected communities.


Regional trends, however, reveal important nuances. Agreement is particularly high in **CRR South (91%)**, **NBR (81%)**, and **CRR North (78%)**, indicating that CSOs in these areas have been especially active and effective in their outreach. **LRR (72%)** and **URR (71%)** also show strong support, while **WCR (60%)** demonstrates a moderately high level of satisfaction. The most notable outlier is **GBA**, where only **26% agree** and a significant **47% disagree**. This suggests that in more urbanised or politically active regions like GBA, expectations of CSO outreach may be higher, and the perceived gap in performance may reflect either more critical scrutiny or actual communication shortcomings in these areas.

Overall, the findings suggest that CSOs are seen as proactive, grassroots-driven, and responsive to the needs of victims. Their ability to operate closer to communities, use accessible language, and engage directly with affected groups appears to have contributed to high satisfaction levels in most regions. However, the significant dissatisfaction in GBA points to a need for targeted improvements—possibly through more consistent engagement, better visibility of outreach activities, and ensuring that information reaches diverse groups in urban contexts where competition for attention is high.

This strong national approval indicates that CSOs are playing an indispensable role in sustaining the TRRC implementation’s credibility, but regional disparities show there is still work to do to achieve consistent communication impact across the country.

Figure 27: CSOs Enough Outreach





Language to communicate TRRC implementation



The data indicates that communication about the implementation of the Government White Paper on the TRRC Report should be delivered in multiple languages to ensure inclusivity and reach diverse communities across the country. The findings reveal that Mandinka is the most widely preferred language, with 82% of respondents selecting it. This highlights its importance as a primary medium for outreach, given its broad comprehension among the population. Wolof, at 69%, and Fula, at 56%, are also significant languages that must be incorporated into communication efforts to cater to large segments of the public. English, chosen by 54% of respondents, remains important, particularly in formal contexts and urban areas, though it ranks slightly lower than the dominant local languages.

Other languages, while less dominant, still hold relevance. Serer (40%), Serahule (38%), Jola (39%), and Aku (37%) have notable representation, pointing to the need for targeted communication in specific communities where these languages are prevalent. Additionally, 13% of respondents selected “Others,” suggesting that smaller language groups exist and should not be overlooked entirely, especially for inclusive grassroots engagement.

The regional breakdown offers further insights into language preferences. In the Greater Banjul Area (GBA), English, Mandinka, and Wolof are all important, indicating the need for trilingual communication. The West Coast Region (WCR) similarly prioritizes these three languages, with Mandinka slightly more prominent. The North Bank Region (NBR) leans heavily towards Mandinka, followed by Wolof and Fula, while the Lower River Region (LRR) exhibits more linguistic diversity, though Mandinka remains dominant. Central River Region (North) shows a stronger preference for Wolof, whereas Central River Region (South) favours Mandinka and Fula. In the Upper River Region (URR), Mandinka, Wolof, and Fula all hold significant representation, underlining its linguistic diversity.

Overall, the findings underscore the necessity of a multilingual communication strategy. Mandinka should be prioritised as the primary outreach language, but Wolof, Fula, and English are also essential for broad coverage. Moreover, incorporating minority languages where regionally significant would promote inclusivity and ensure victims and victim-led organisations across all regions receive timely and understandable information. This approach would enhance transparency, foster trust, and strengthen public engagement in the TRRC implementation process.

Figure 28: Language to Communicate TRRC Implementation



Thematic analysis of communication effectiveness

This thematic analysis explores how information about the TRRC and its implementation has been shared, and how it could be improved.

“The recommendations of the Government White Paper on the TRRC recommendations were published on different media outlets by the Government, for the public to be well informed about it. And after the publishing, they have not done any implementation of the white paper so far. Also, communication between the Government and the victims concerning the implementation of the recommendation is not very smooth” (P6, FGD, Brikama, CRR South, 2025).

“I know TRRC through our focal person, he was the one who gave us the information and invited us during the launching of the Government White paper” (P4, FGD, Essau, CRR North, 2025).

“We heard it from the newspapers and social media” (P1, FGD, Jambur, WCR).

“We get information from the civil society and that’s why it is easier for us to understand” (P2, FGD, Jambur, WCR).

Most of the participants expressed opinions that are similar to and corroborated the responses of P1, P2, P3, P4 and P5.

In addition to the effectiveness of communication, participants were asked whether the information was provided in a **language or format that victims understand**, e.g., information in English only, or local languages and/or oral briefings were used.

“The pieces of information were in languages we could not understand; the Government should have done oral briefings with the victims, but that was not done” (P1, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“Yes, the information was in English, but local languages or oral briefing were used for people to understand” (P4, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025).

The rest of the participants expressed opinions that are similar to and corroborate the responses of FGD P1.

On the overall effectiveness of communication, victims were asked how well they think the Government has communicated to the public its plans and progress on the Government’s White Paper on the implementation of the TRRC Report and recommendations to the public. In response to this question, *the participants stated:*

“The Government has not communicated well. Most of us, the victims, have no track of the progress of the implementation of TRRC’s recommendations because we hardly hear from the Government about the project” (P1, FGD, Jambur, WCR, 2025).

“No idea because we hear no plans from the Government concerning the implementation of the TRRC recommendations” (P2, FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025).

“Not so well because we have no idea about what the White Paper entails” (P3 FGD, Sintet, Foni Jarol, 2025).

Other participants learned about the Government White Paper on the TRRC Report and recommendations through different channels, including radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, town meetings, social media, and family/friends. Specifically, FGD participants from Sintet Village, Foni Jarol District, received communication about the Government White Paper on the implementation of the TRRC Report and recommendations through various means.

“I learned about it through a white lady who came to interview us, after which I started hearing it on TV/Radio” (P1, Sinteh Village, Foni Jarol District).

“I learned about it through CSO and the focal person during community consultation” (P2, Sinteh Village, Foni Jarol District).

“I learned about it through TV or Radio” (P3, Sinteh Village, Foni Jarol District).

“I learned about it through TRRC personnel on their community consultation” (P4, Sinteh Village, Foni Jarol District).


GOVERNMENT HAS MANAGED VICTIMS' EXPECTATIONS

The data indicate a generally negative perception among respondents regarding the government's ability to manage victims' expectations in implementing the White Paper on the TRRC report.

Nationally, a significant majority of respondents disagreed (58%) or strongly disagreed (6%) with the statement, suggesting widespread dissatisfaction. Only a small proportion expressed agreement (13%) or strong agreement (4%), while 19% remained neutral.

When examined regionally, this trend of dissatisfaction is consistent. Disagreement levels are particularly high in the Greater Banjul Area (79%), Upper River Region (75%), Lower River Region (62%), Central River Region North (63%), and Central River Region South (62%). Even in regions with relatively lower disagreement levels, such as the West Coast Region (60%) and North Bank Region (35%), disagreement still outweighs agreement by a considerable margin.

Figure 29: The Government made Enough Outreach



Agreement is minimal across all regions, with the highest positive sentiment recorded in the Central River Region South (26%) and North Bank Region (17%). This limited support may suggest that in some local contexts, victims have seen slightly more proactive engagement or communication from the government, but these remain exceptions rather than the norm. Overall, the data highlights a widespread perception that the government has not been sufficiently effective in managing victims' expectations, with particularly strong dissatisfaction in most regions. This suggests a need for improved engagement, communication, and delivery on commitments to regain victims' trust in the implementation process.

Government committed to implementation of TRRC White Paper

The data on public perceptions regarding the Government's political commitment to implementing the White Paper on the Report of the TRRC shows mixed opinions, with notable regional variations.


At the national level, a significant proportion of respondents, 38%, agreed that the Government has shown political commitment, while 6% strongly agreed. However, a considerable segment remains unconvinced, with 29% disagreeing and 7% strongly disagreeing, indicating that over a third of the population harbours scepticism about the Government's dedication. Additionally, 20% of respondents expressed neutrality, reflecting either uncertainty or a wait-and-see attitude.


The regional breakdown provides a more nuanced picture. In the Greater Banjul Area (GBA), the perception is more negative, with 63% disagreeing and only a small proportion showing agreement. The West Coast Region (WCR) is somewhat divided, with 35% agreeing and 27% disagreeing, while a significant portion remains neutral. In the North Bank Region (NBR), 45% agreed, reflecting relatively higher confidence, although 24% still disagreed. Lower River Region (LRR) also has a high level of disagreement (61%), suggesting limited belief in Government commitment there.

Interestingly, Central River Region (North) shows overwhelming positivity, with 74% agreeing — the highest across all regions — pointing to strong confidence in the Government's political will. Central River Region (South) is more balanced, with 43% disagreement but also notable levels of agreement. Upper River Region (URR) shows relatively high agreement (49%), although scepticism persists among some respondents.

Overall, while there is a clear segment of the population — particularly in CRR (North), URR, and NBR — that believes the Government is politically committed to the implementation process, large pockets of doubt exist, especially in GBA and LRR. This divergence in perception may be shaped by differences in local outreach, communication, and direct engagement with the process.

Figure 30: Government Committed to Implementation of TRRC





Findings from the perspective of shareholders

The Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) engaged eight categories of institutions: The National Assembly, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Post-TRRC Unit/Office of the Special Adviser, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the Victim Centre, the Gambia Federation of the Disabled (GFD), and faith-based organisations. Collectively, these institutions provided a diverse and critical perspective on the progress and shortcomings of implementing the TRRC recommendations. Their views reveal areas of consensus—such as recognition of progress on laws and reparations—and areas of divergence, particularly around inclusivity, political will, transparency, and the pace of prosecutions.

Awareness and understanding of TRRC findings and Government White Paper

This analysis explores the perceptions of stakeholders regarding awareness and understanding of the TRRC’s findings and recommendations, the Government White Paper derived from those recommendations, and the role of legislative oversight. The themes reveal a generally high level of awareness but point to gaps in legislative engagement during the White Paper’s development, challenges with government follow-through, and the oversight role played by parliament.

Theme 1: Understanding and acceptance of TRRC findings and recommendations

The interviewee affirms that the Government has accepted over 90% of the TRRC’s recommendations as summarised in the White Paper, committing to their implementation, especially regarding reparations and transitional justice mechanisms.

“Government accepted more than 90% of TRRC recommendations and committed to implement them through the White Paper.”

However, there is scepticism about the genuineness of the small percentage of recommendations rejected. In some interviews, participants cited the case of Momodou Sabally, who was reinstated to public positions despite earlier recommendations to bar them from office. It is important to note, however, that these examples relate to the Janneh Commission rather than the TRRC. Still, their mention illustrates a broader perception among victims and citizens that government commitments to accountability may be selective or inconsistent.

Taken together, this theme highlights a dual perception: on one hand, broad endorsement of the TRRC's findings by the state, and on the other, doubts about genuine commitment to impartial implementation. Respondents worry that these inconsistencies could erode trust in the process and weaken prospects for justice and reconciliation.

Theme 2: Role of National Assembly in oversight and monitoring

The interviewees clarify that the National Assembly, particularly the Standing Committee on Human Rights and Constitutional Matters, was not involved in developing the White Paper but holds a critical oversight role in monitoring its implementation.

“Our Committee oversees the National Human Rights Commission, which monitors the White Paper implementation and reports annually to us.”

This oversight role includes digesting reports, raising concerns, and potentially summoning ministers or officials to explain delays or shortcomings.

“We use our oversight powers to question responsible officials when necessary.”

This highlights the separation of roles: the Executive develops and endorses policy (White Paper), while the legislature monitors and ensures accountability, emphasising the checks-and-balances function in transitional justice implementation.

Theme 3: Familiarity with legislative framework and obligations

The respondents show familiarity with critical legislative instruments enacted to support TRRC implementation:

“The Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act 2023, Special Prosecutor’s Office Act 2024, and Victims Reparations Commission Act 2023 are in place to enable prosecution and reparations”

The absence of such laws earlier would have prevented the effective prosecution of offences like torture.

“Without the Torture Act, torture could not be tried in the Gambia.”

This reflects awareness of the importance of legislative infrastructure for operationalising transitional justice and indicates progress in establishing legal bases to enforce TRRC recommendations.

Theme 4: Limited involvement in White Paper Development but active engagement in review

The interviewee stated that the National Assembly did not participate in the White Paper's creation because it is an executive product responding to TRRC recommendations.

"We were not involved in the White Paper's development because our role is lawmaking and oversight."

However, the Assembly engages actively post-publication, especially through annual consultations facilitated by the National Human Rights Commission.

"We follow up implementation progress via stakeholder consultations almost every year."

This points to a division of responsibilities where the legislature does not influence initial executive policy decisions but plays a crucial role in monitoring and influencing implementation. The ongoing consultations indicate a collaborative approach to tracking progress.

Overall, most institutions demonstrated a high level of awareness of the TRRC recommendations and the Government White Paper. Legislators and justice sector actors noted that the government had formally accepted the overwhelming majority of recommendations, which they saw as a sign of political commitment. Civil society organisations, victims' groups, and the NHRC equally acknowledged this, but also stressed the gap between formal acceptance and visible action on the ground.

For example, one legislator explained the scale of acceptance:

"Government accepted more than 90% of TRRC recommendations and committed to implement them through the White Paper."

The Ministry of Justice echoed this, noting:

"Out of 265 recommendations, 263 were accepted. Our mandate has been to coordinate implementation within the White Paper timelines."

The NHRC highlighted its role in ensuring follow-up:

"Our role has been to track government commitments and report annually on the state of human rights and transitional justice."

At the community level, the Victim Centre confirmed that awareness-raising has been central to its work:

“We make sure victims and the public understand what has been recommended and the timelines for implementing these recommendations.”

The GFD drew attention to marginalised victims:

“Many victims with disabilities are not even aware of what reparations mean, or how to access them.”

The president of the Supreme Islamic Council underscored their interest only in specific recommendations:

“Yes, I’m aware... the recommendation that concerns the Supreme Islamic Council is number 10... it relates to legal matters and politics.”

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT

This analysis explores the role of institutions/stakeholders in overseeing the implementation of TRRC recommendations, focusing on parliamentary structures, debates, and inquiry practices related to transitional justice and reparations. It reveals a system where parliamentary oversight is primarily exercised through the Standing Committee on Human Rights and Constitutional Matters in coordination with the National Human Rights Commission, highlighting procedural limitations, engagement modalities, and challenges in accountability enforcement.

Theme 1: Delegated oversight via National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

The National Assembly delegates direct implementation oversight to the National Human Rights Commission, with Parliament’s Standing Committee on Human Rights and Constitutional Matters assuming an oversight and consultative role over the NHRC’s work on TRRC implementation.

“The implementation of TRRC recommendations is primarily the duty of the National Human Rights Commission.”

“Our Human Rights Committee places an oversight function on the NHRC and is involved in some stakeholder meetings to follow implementation stages.”

Parliament relies on periodic consultation rather than direct, continuous monitoring, reflecting a collaborative but indirect oversight model. Parliament functions as a supervisory body primarily through the NHRC, which is the lead implementing agency for TRRC recommendations. This institutional setup suggests a separation between direct legislative oversight and operational implementation, potentially limiting parliamentary control to reactive and advisory roles rather than proactive enforcement.

Theme 2: Parliamentary structures for oversight and legislative scrutiny

There is no dedicated parliamentary committee specifically for transitional justice or reparations; these responsibilities fall under the broader Standing Committee on Human Rights and Constitutional Matters.

“No specific Committee for transitional justice exists; it falls under the Standing Committee on Human Rights.”

“This Committee scrutinises and interrogates bills related to reparations and justice, such as the Victims Reparations Act and the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act.”

This Committee has been active in reviewing and processing relevant legislation connected to the TRRC’s mandate. Oversight and monitoring of transitional justice are embedded within an existing Committee with a broad human rights mandate, reflecting a pragmatic use of parliamentary resources but potentially diluting focus. Legislative scrutiny is active, ensuring laws connected to TRRC recommendations receive due parliamentary attention.

Theme 3: Parliamentary actions on implementation progress and challenges

The Parliament, including the Committee on Human Rights and Constitutional Matters, has not directly conducted formal inquiries or hearings into implementation delays. Instead, oversight occurs through questioning Ministers during plenary sessions and engaging in stakeholder consultations primarily involving the NHRC.

“We have not directly held hearings or inquiries, but engage through parliamentary questions and participation in NHRC stakeholder meetings.”

“Concerns have been raised about the slow pace of implementation, including expressing frustration in meetings with government officials.”

Parliamentarians show awareness and concern about delays but lack a formal mechanism to compel faster action. The absence of formal hearings or inquiries suggests limited assertiveness or structural constraints in parliamentary oversight of TRRC implementation. Parliamentary questioning serves as a channel for accountability but may lack enforcement power, highlighting a gap between oversight intent and practical impact. Notably, the Committee on Human Rights and Constitutional Matters has never placed the NHRC’s annual monitoring reports for discussion and adoption by the National Assembly. If such reports were debated and adopted, the Assembly would be better positioned to hold Government Implementing Entities accountable for implementation.

Theme 4: Progress in appointments and legal frameworks

The Parliament has played a role in confirming applicants to the Reparations Commission, following a public application process that was advertised in newspapers. This indicates tangible involvement in operationalising TRRC-related institutions, though its role was limited to endorsement rather than direct nomination of Commissioners by the Government.

“The Reparations Commission is set up, Commissioners appointed and confirmed by Parliament, pending operationalisation”

“The Special Prosecutor’s Office, critical for prosecutions, was created and legislated through Parliament”

Such legislative actions demonstrate concrete steps in institutionalising transitional justice mechanisms. Parliament’s role in confirming appointments and passing enabling legislation underscores its functional contributions to the implementation process, even if oversight is less proactive. These actions are essential building blocks for actual justice delivery and reparations.

LEGAL AND POLICY REFORMS

This section explores legislative responses and reforms by the National Assembly related to the implementation of TRRC recommendations. It focuses on the passage of laws establishing reparations and accountability mechanisms and the legislative foundation for key institutions like the Special Prosecutor’s Office and Reparations Commission. The analysis reveals both progress in lawmaking and clarifications regarding institutional mandates.

Theme 1: Passage of key laws implementing TRRC recommendations

The Assembly has formally enacted several critical pieces of legislation that translate TRRC recommendations into law. Among the major achievements is the transformation of the Victims Reparations Bill into law, which enabled the appointment of Commissioners and operationalisation of reparations.

“The Victims Reparations Bill is no longer a bill; it is an Act with Presidential assent”

“The government has recruited Commissioners to operationalise victim reparations.”

Other important laws include those establishing the Special Prosecutor’s Office to pursue accountability and various human rights-related Acts, such as Torture legislation and laws governing special procedures.

“Special Prosecutor’s Office law is in place... torture and reparation laws are part of the human rights legislative framework”

This theme highlights significant legislative progress as a foundation for transitional justice implementation. The passage and presidential assent to these laws demonstrate political commitment to creating institutional mechanisms for reparations and accountability aligned with TRRC directives. The integration of human rights-focused laws further contextualises these reforms within broader justice objectives.

Theme 2: Legislative status of institutions (special tribunal, medical board, Reparations Commission)

Regarding institutional setups, there is some clarification and overlap in terminology and functions:

The Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO), established under the Special Prosecutor's Act, 2024, is responsible for prosecuting Jammeh-era crimes. To try these cases, the Act empowers the Chief Justice to establish a Special Criminal Division of the High Court, which will serve as the national special tribunal. In addition, the SAM Act provides for the creation of an International Tribunal in partnership with ECOWAS, ensuring that serious crimes with regional implications are addressed through broader cooperation.

On the Medical Board, the respondent notes uncertainty about new legislation, clarifying that existing Medical Boards already function and that they are unaware of a specific new legal act for a Medical Board tied to the TRRC.

"There are existing Medical Boards, but I'm not aware of a new specific Act for a Medical Board related to TRRC."

The Reparations Commission has a clear legislative mandate with its enabling law already in place.

"The Reparations Commission is established by law and operational."

This theme underscores the institutional framework established to address Jammeh-era crimes. The Special Prosecutor's Act, 2024, created three key entities: the Office of the Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO) to handle prosecutions, the Special Criminal Division of the Gambian High Court as the national special tribunal, and an International Tribunal in partnership with ECOWAS to address serious crimes. Importantly, the SPO is not itself a tribunal but rather the prosecutorial arm tasked with bringing cases before the courts. Meanwhile, the continued reliance on Medical Boards without corresponding legislative reform points to operational continuity in certain areas, raising questions about whether further legal anchoring is required to strengthen accountability mechanisms.

Overall, respondents acknowledged significant legal reforms and institutional creation as visible outputs of implementation. Parliamentarians, the MoJ, and the Post-TRRC Unit highlighted the enactment of the Victims Reparations Act 2023, the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act 2023, the Special Accountability Mechanism (TRRC) Act 2024 and the Special Prosecutor's Office Act 2024, which create the Special Prosecutor's Office as

milestones. Civil society organisations and victims, while acknowledging these gains, were more cautious, noting gaps in enforcement and delays in prosecutions.

As one MP put it: *“The Victims Reparations Bill is no longer a bill; it is an act with presidential assent.”*

The MoJ stressed its efforts: *“We have created the Special Prosecutor’s Office and the Reparations Commission as part of our commitments.”*

The Post-TRRC Unit explained its coordination role: *“Our office was established precisely to coordinate reforms, follow up on White Paper commitments, and ensure institutions are functional.”*

The NHRC underlined the significance of legal reform for accountability: *“The Torture Act is significant. Without it, torture could not be prosecuted in The Gambia.”*

The Victim Centre went further: *“Victims consistently demand prosecutions... they always ask: when will the government prosecute?”*

Religious leaders, meanwhile, advocated for their own priorities in lawmaking: *“We drafted a Supreme Islamic Council Establishment Act... we also want laws against blasphemy.”*

BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT OF TRRC IMPLEMENTATION

This analysis investigates perspectives on the National Assembly’s role in scrutinising and allocating budgetary resources for implementing the TRRC recommendations in The Gambia. It explores perceptions of adequacy, fiscal constraints, and the institutional division of responsibilities related to funding transitional justice initiatives. The findings reveal ongoing budget allocations, concerns over adequacy, and a clear delineation of roles between the legislature and the executive in securing and managing resources.

Theme 1: Parliamentary budget scrutiny and allocation

The National Assembly actively debates and allocates funds within national budgets to support TRRC implementation, particularly for the Reparations Commission. Budget lines have been included in successive budgets (2024 and 2025), with plans for increased allocation in 2026.

“The budget for reparations has been mentioned during sessions, with allocations made in both the 2024 and 2025 budgets”

“Parliament plans to increase the budget line further in the 2026 budget.”

Budget details are publicly accessible online, enhancing transparency.

“The Minister of Finance has published the budget, including the amount allocated for TRRC activities.”

Additionally, funds from the sale of former President Jammeh's assets held in a special Central Bank account are earmarked to supplement reparations funding.

"There is a conditional account in the Central Bank for proceeds from the former President's assets, intended to support victims."

This theme reflects active parliamentary oversight with formal budget lines dedicated to transitional justice. Incremental increases signal a recognition of ongoing financial needs. Public access to budget information and earmarked special funds indicates efforts to maintain fiscal transparency and accountability.

Theme 2: Perceptions of inadequate resources

The respondent clearly perceives the current budget allocations as insufficient, given the large number of victims and the substantial costs of compensating them.

"Given the many victims, both direct and indirect, the allocated resources are inadequate to cover reparations"

"The number of reported cases that require monetary compensation is very high"

This theme highlights a common challenge in transitional justice contexts: the financial demands often exceed available resources. The scale of victimisation in The Gambia makes adequately funding reparations difficult within existing budgetary constraints.

Theme 3: Fiscal constraints and budget realities

The respondent acknowledges that broader fiscal realities constrain budget allocations:

"The national budget has limits; if the demand exceeds available resources, deficits arise"

"The budget must consider the entire country's needs, not just reparations."

These constraints require realistic budget planning and prioritisation within a finite resource envelope.

This theme underscores the tension between aspirational funding needs and practical fiscal limits faced by governments. Budget allocations must balance multiple national priorities, making it challenging to fully fund reparations programs.

Theme 4: Legislative roles vs. Executive responsibility

There is a clear distinction made between Parliament's role in allocating budget lines and the government's role in sourcing funds beyond allocations:

"Parliament's job is to allocate funds in the budget; it does not seek loans or grants"

"It is the government's responsibility to find additional resources, whether through loans or grants"

This separation reflects institutional roles within The Gambia's governance system. This theme illustrates institutional boundaries in fiscal management. The Legislature controls appropriations but relies on the Executive branch to manage the country's broader financial strategy, including securing external funding if needed.

Theme 5: Prospects for supplementary funding

While current budget lines are insufficient, there is hope for supplementary funding through the sale of former President Jammeh's assets and possible future resource discoveries.

"Proceeds from asset sales are expected to supplement reparations funds"

"There may be other undiscovered assets that could add to available resources."

This theme highlights potential financial avenues outside the formal budget, which could help close funding gaps. It also suggests some optimism that the resource base for reparations may expand with continued government efforts.

All institutions acknowledged that financial resources for reparations and institutional reforms remain inadequate. Parliamentarians pointed to explicit budget lines in 2024 and 2025, and MoJ officials stressed the constraints of national fiscal priorities. Civil society and victims' organisations argued that allocations are too small compared to the scale of victim needs.

Parliamentarians explained: *"The budget for reparations has been mentioned during sessions, with allocations in both the 2024 and 2025 budgets."*

The MoJ admitted: *"The national budget has constraints, and transitional justice must compete with other priorities."*

The Post-TRRC Unit added: *"Part of our challenge is ensuring that reparations and institutional reforms are not starved of funding."*

The NHRC noted delays breed mistrust: *"When resources are delayed, victims interpret it as a lack of commitment."*

Civil society was frank: *“Given the many victims... the allocated resources are inadequate to cover reparations.”*

The Victim Centre stressed how NGOs have filled gaps: *“We’ve been supporting victims with medical, school, and psychosocial support because the government’s package is not enough.”* The GFD insisted on equity: *“Disabled victims should not be sidelined in reparations; the criteria must reflect their unique experiences.”*

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

This analysis examines perceived legislative and political challenges as well as opportunities related to parliamentary oversight of the Government White Paper’s implementation. The discussion highlights the formal mandate and capacity of Parliament in exercising oversight, the political dynamics influencing decision-making, and prospective strategies for strengthening accountability mechanisms. The findings underscore the tension between institutional potential and political realities shaping transitional justice oversight in The Gambia.

Theme 2: Institutional capacity for oversight

The respondent asserts that Parliament, as an independent institution governed by its own rules, holds a clear mandate to conduct oversight over government departments, including the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) tasked with White Paper implementation.

“Parliament is a free institution, and it goes by its own rules... our mandate is to play an oversight function on government and related departments”

“The Human Rights Committee will scrutinise submitted reports and determine follow-up actions”

“We will invite NHRC and government officials to account for overdue matters.”

This theme highlights the formal structural strength and procedural autonomy of Parliament to hold implementing bodies accountable. The existing framework allows for report review, committee evaluation, and direct engagement with relevant stakeholders, positioning Parliament as a key actor in oversight.

Theme 2: Political challenges in oversight

Despite institutional capacity, political challenges arise from the partisan nature of Parliament. The majority party (National People’s Party) holds greater numbers, influencing outcomes on the Assembly floor.

“This is a political house divided into different political parties”

“Decisions require a simple majority vote; the ruling party’s majority often dictates outcomes”

“Even if Committees push for oversight actions, final decisions depend on the parliamentary majority”

“Political challenges are affecting legislative drafts and oversight effectiveness”

This theme reflects the realities of political contestation affecting legislative oversight. The dominance of the ruling party limits opposition influence, which can hinder robust accountability, especially on sensitive or politically charged issues like transitional justice implementation.

Theme 3: Opportunities to strengthen Parliamentary accountability

The respondent emphasises that Parliament already possesses the legal and constitutional tools to strengthen oversight but stresses the need for proactive engagement.

“Parliament has every legislative power to hold the Executive accountable”

“We have a body (NHRC) that should act, and Parliament must hold it responsible for the results”

“Parliament must actively demand specific actions and monitor their fulfilment”

This theme underscores the potential for Parliament to leverage its formal powers to enhance executive accountability. The key opportunity lies in translating constitutional authority into consistent, active oversight practices focused on results and follow-up.

Despite challenges, there was consensus that progress had been made. Key laws are in place, Commissions established, and reparations have begun. But significant gaps remain—particularly around prosecutions, Security Sector Reform, and the pace of implementation. MoJ: *“We have delivered on laws, but implementation in areas like the security sector is ongoing.”*

NHRC: *“Security sector reform remains the weakest link.”*

Victim Centre: *“Victims consistently demand the prosecution of perpetrators.”*

CSO: *“Renaming the NIA to SIS is symbolic, not substantive reform.”*

Furthermore, transparency and communication emerged as one of the weakest points. Legislators and CSOs complained of minimal government disclosure. The MoJ admitted that communication is inconsistent. The NHRC and civil society have tried to fill the gap through outreach, translations, and media campaigns, but both noted that systemic online reporting is lacking.

An MP captured the frustration: *“Huge, huge, huge gap... ”*

The MoJ acknowledged: *“We need to improve communication. Many assume nothing is happening simply because information is not shared consistently.”*

The NHRC described its role: *“We use radio, caravans, and community outreach to keep the public informed.”*

CSOs proposed a solution: *“There should be a public tracker—how many recommendations resolved, in progress, or not started.”*

Religious leaders observed that silence fuels suspicion: *“People think nothing is happening because they don’t see the results.”*

VICTIM CENTRED APPROACH AND INCLUSIVITY

This analysis explores how the National Assembly ensures representation and inclusivity of victims and vulnerable populations—such as women, persons with disabilities (PWDs), and rural communities—in legislative discussions and consultations. It also examines the Assembly’s perceived role in promoting an inclusive implementation of TRRC recommendations. The findings suggest formal institutional mechanisms exist for inclusion, supported by specific legislation, but also highlight the Assembly’s primary role as an oversight body rather than a direct policy initiator.

Theme 1: Institutional representation of vulnerable groups

The Assembly has established specific Parliamentary Committees focused on vulnerable populations, including children, women, and persons with disabilities.

“There is a whole Committee on children, women, and people with disabilities.”

Further, the Assembly has passed targeted legislation to protect and promote the rights of these groups, evidencing formal recognition in law.

“Bills have been passed such as the Disability Act, Women’s Act, and Children’s Act.”

These structures and laws indicate a deliberate institutional approach to ensure that vulnerable groups’ voices are not marginalised during legislative processes. By embedding these concerns within committees and dedicated legislation, the Assembly shows procedural inclusivity and an acknowledgement of diverse societal needs.

Theme 2: The role of the National Assembly in inclusive implementation

While policies addressing inclusivity exist in law and the constitution, the Assembly sees its primary role as oversight—to ensure government action aligns with these policies.

“Parliament needs to play its oversight function to make sure the government acts.”

The respondent acknowledges legislative imperfection but emphasises the Assembly’s duty to uphold existing laws and push for their implementation.

“It is the government’s responsibility to come up with policies, but parliament must stand firm and oversee their execution.”

This theme highlights a clear division of labour: the Assembly legislates and monitors, but the Executive is responsible for actual policy formulation and execution. The Assembly’s role as a watchdog or guarantor of inclusivity in implementation is crucial to bridging policy and practice gaps.

On victim participation, institutions gave mixed accounts. The MoJ and Post-TRRC Unit argued that victims were consulted in shaping reparations legislation and involved in some processes. Civil society and victims themselves countered that consultations were limited, tokenistic, and did not always translate into meaningful influence. The NHRC and GFD particularly stressed the need for inclusion of women, persons with disabilities, and rural victims.

The MoJ argued: *“Victims were involved in developing the reparations bill and in the selection of commissioners.”*

The Victim Centre offered a more cautious view: *“Living in a box... very limited. Many victims felt their stories weren’t important.”*

CSOs described participation as symbolic: *“Invitations were occasionally sent via email, but participation has not been the way we should.”*

The NHRC emphasised: *“Our engagement always prioritises women, persons with disabilities, and rural victims.”*

The GFD was blunt: *“Persons with disabilities were not properly consulted, yet many suffered the most.”*

Traditional leaders explained their own role: *“At the moment, they are the peacemakers in this country... but sometimes we are not an authority to decide, the Government must step in.”*

PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S ROLE IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

This analysis explores the National Assembly's (Parliament's) role in public engagement, transparency, legislative oversight, and institutional reform within The Gambia's transitional justice framework. It captures insights on how information is communicated to the public, the mechanisms for citizen engagement, legislative challenges, and reflections on Parliament's legacy in upholding justice, truth, and accountability post-TRRC. The findings highlight a framework that combines openness, active oversight, legislative reform needs, and calls for constitutional strengthening to foster democratic governance and transitional justice.

Theme 1: Transparency and public engagement mechanisms

The Parliament conducts its discussions publicly, often live-streamed, providing citizens with open access to legislative proceedings related to the White Paper implementation.

"National Assembly sessions are open and mostly live-streamed, so the public can follow unless they choose not to."

However, the main responsibility for informing the public about progress lies with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which actively reports to the Assembly and engages communities through media and outreach programs.

"The NHRC is empowered to follow up on the White Paper's implementation and communicate progress through radio, TV, and outreach caravans."

Transparency is institutionalised through open parliamentary proceedings and proactive NHRC public engagement. NHRC's regional presence and multimedia strategies position it as a key bridge between government actions and public awareness, fostering participatory governance in transitional justice.

Theme 2: Legislative oversight and gap identification

The respondent emphasises Parliament's role in legislating and scrutinising laws related to transitional justice, with the Human Rights Committee best placed to identify and address legislative gaps.

"Parliament should assess existing laws through the Human Rights Committee to find and fill gaps related to transitional justice."

The process is ongoing and iterative, requiring collective committee work rather than ad hoc responses.

"It's a process that the committee regularly undertakes, not something decided offhand."

Legislative oversight is viewed as a continuous, systematic function requiring specialised parliamentary bodies. This ensures that the legal framework adapts and remains responsive to emerging transitional justice needs, reinforcing accountability and legal coherence.

Theme 3: Institutional and constitutional reforms for checks and balances

A key area of proposed reform under the TRRC recommendations and reflected in the Government's White Paper relates to governance and institutional accountability. These recommendations call for measures such as strengthening judicial independence, ensuring security sector reforms, repealing repressive laws like the Public Order Act, and establishing independent oversight bodies to prevent the recurrence of past abuses. Together, these reforms are aimed at reinforcing checks and balances within the Gambian governance system, while directly addressing institutional weaknesses identified by the TRRC.

This reform is seen as essential for institutional independence, allowing key officials (e.g., police chief, judiciary heads) to perform their duties without undue executive influence.

“If key officials owe their position solely to the president, they may feel pressured to align with the president's wishes rather than serve justice fairly”

The recommendation underscores the importance of democratic institutional reform post-authoritarianism. Parliamentary vetting mechanisms can enhance transparency and integrity in governance, crucial for sustaining transitional justice and preventing abuse of power.

Theme 4: National Assembly role in the broader transitional justice framework

The National Assembly is recognised as central to the transitional justice process through its law-making mandate.

“Justice cannot be achieved without laws, and Parliament is the body that enacts these laws.”

Post-legislative scrutiny is highlighted as a key oversight function, ensuring laws are effectively implemented and adapted.

“Parliament should monitor laws after passage to see if they function as intended and amend where necessary.”

Although government bills predominate, there is scope for individual MPs to propose laws (Private Member's Bill) supporting transitional justice.

This theme highlights the legislative lifecycle's critical role, from law creation to ongoing oversight, ensuring that transitional justice mechanisms are effective and responsive to evolving needs.

Theme 5: Legacy aspirations for Parliament

The interviewee aspires for Parliament's legacy to be defined by the quality of laws passed and rigorous oversight ensuring their implementation.

"Parliament's legacy will depend on good laws and strong, consistent oversight to ensure those laws work."

Post-legislative scrutiny is presented as a best practice that Parliament should institutionalise to safeguard transitional justice achievements.

This reflects an awareness that durable justice systems require both sound legal frameworks and ongoing political will to enforce them. Parliament's proactive role can embed justice principles within governance structures, ensuring lasting impact.

Overall, many institutions noted that politics and partisanship complicate implementation. Parliamentarians admitted divisions weaken oversight. Civil society rated performance modest, citing delays. The MoJ emphasised the need for patience, while the NHRC noted a weak accountability culture across institutions. Religious leaders took a different angle, cautioning that reconciliation requires more than legalism.

An MP reflected: *"This is a political house divided... a simple majority often dictates outcomes."*

A CSO assessed and rated the performance of the Government as: *"Five out of ten... and cited delays and partial reforms in the implementation of the TRRC's recommendations."*

The MoJ countered: *"Reforms take time... our mandate is to move steadily but surely."*

The NHRC highlighted: *"Institutions are reluctant to hold each other accountable. This weakens checks and balances."*

Religious leaders warned: *"In reconciliation, you should forget the law... if you come with the law, there is no reconciliation."*

CONCLUSION

This Perception Study demonstrates that The Gambia's transitional justice process stands at a delicate crossroads. The TRRC achieved a historic milestone in truth-telling, victim recognition, and collective memory-building. Its proceedings uncovered decades of gross human rights violations and gave victims a voice on a national platform. However, the promise of justice, reparations, and institutional reform has not yet been fully realised. While the Government's White Paper signalled strong political will by accepting the overwhelming majority of the TRRC recommendations, the pace of implementation has been uneven. Delays, inadequate communication, resource limitations, and fragmented institutional coordination have left many victims anxious, disillusioned, and sceptical about the state's commitment.

Across victims and communities, the Study found consistent demands for justice that are both restorative and retributive. Victims called not only for fair reparations—including financial support, psychosocial healing, medical care, and livelihood assistance—but also for prosecutions that break with the culture of impunity. Many emphasised that without credible prosecutions, “reconciliation will remain incomplete.” At the same time, community reconciliation and psychosocial support were repeatedly underscored as urgent, unfinished needs. These findings reflect a strong desire for transitional justice that balances accountability with healing.

Institutional perspectives reinforced the complexity of this task. The Post-TRRC Office, Ministry of Justice, and NHRC remain central to implementation but operate under severe resource and capacity constraints. Parliament acknowledges its oversight but remains divided along political lines, limiting robust accountability. Civil society organisations, including the Victim Centre, Gambia Participates, and the Gambia Federation of the Disabled, continue to play vital roles in amplifying victim voices and monitoring reforms, but they too face structural and funding pressures. Religious and traditional leaders framed justice more in terms of reconciliation and forgiveness, with some hesitancy around endorsing prosecutions. Importantly, the involvement of the Ghanaian survivor’s family highlighted the regional and international dimensions of justice, and the urgent need for The Gambia to demonstrate accountability to non-Gambian victims as well.

The Study also exposed gaps in transparency and information-sharing. Victims and stakeholders alike lamented the huge gaps in timely, accessible reporting on implementation progress. Many stressed the need for a public tracker on TRRC recommendations to build accountability and public confidence. Equally, while the NHRC has emerged as a relatively trusted oversight body, its capacity to reach all communities remains stretched, requiring stronger institutional support.

Taken together, the perspectives of victims, communities, and institutions reveal that transitional justice in The Gambia has achieved important milestones but remains incomplete and fragile. There is visible progress—laws enacted, reparations initiated, institutions established—but gaps in implementation continue to erode trust. Without decisive and accelerated action, the widening gap between victims’ expectations and institutional delivery risks undermining both reconciliation and democratic consolidation.

Moving forward, the findings point to several urgent imperatives:

1. **Strengthened political will** to move beyond rhetoric to credible prosecutions and genuine reform.
2. **Adequate and predictable resource allocation** to reparations, prosecutions, and psychosocial healing.
3. **Inclusive participation**, ensuring that victims, women, youth, and persons with disabilities are not only consulted but actively involved in shaping decisions.

4. **Transparency and communication**, including the creation of an accessible public tracker to measure implementation of TRRC recommendations.
5. **Regional accountability**, recognising that The Gambia’s transitional justice obligations extend beyond its borders to non-Gambian victims.

In sum, transitional justice in The Gambia has moved forward but remains at risk of losing momentum. Sustaining progress will require stronger leadership, inclusive participation, and systemic transparency. Only through decisive action that keeps victims at the centre can the promise of “Never Again” be transformed from aspiration into reality.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of this Perception Survey, supported by quantitative data, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews, reveal both notable progress and critical gaps in the implementation of the TRRC recommendations and the Government’s White Paper. While important milestones have been achieved—such as the enactment of the Victims Reparations Act, the establishment of new accountability institutions, and budgetary allocations for reparations—victims, civil society, and oversight bodies continue to highlight slow implementation, limited inclusivity, and persistent concerns about transparency and accountability.

The recommendations below are designed to address these challenges. They are structured to reflect **immediate short-term actions**, **medium-term reforms**, and **longer-term structural measures**, thereby ensuring that the transitional justice process remains both victim-centred and sustainable. Direct quotations from institutions and stakeholders are included to ground the proposals in lived perspectives and reinforce their urgency.

Short term priorities (immediate actions, 2025 – 2026)

1. Accelerate reparations delivery

- **The Reparations Commission** should deliver timely, fair, and transparent reparations, covering financial compensation, medical care, psychosocial support, livelihood restoration, and symbolic measures such as memorialization.
- **The Reparations Commission** should also ensure that reparations are gender-sensitive and inclusive of vulnerable groups such as widows, orphans, and persons with disabilities.

In support of these recommendations, the Victim Centre emphasised the importance of **funding reparations using domestic resources and ensuring continuous engagement with victims**. Similarly, the Gambia Federation of the Disabled (GFD) stressed the need to **make reparations disability-sensitive**.

2. Enhance victim participation and communication

- Establish **regular consultation forums** between victims and institutions, both at national and regional levels, to ensure victims' voices directly shape policies.
- Improve communication of progress to reduce misinformation. As one CSO put it: *"huge, huge, huge gap... like Banjul and Barra bridge. Publish the data so people can access it even when they are sleeping."*
- NHRC should lead in publishing **regular, open-access progress reports**: *"regular, open-access reporting will build trust."*

3. Improve transparency and independent oversight

- **NHRC** to create a public tracker to monitor TRRC recommendation implementation, showing progress categories (resolved, in progress, not started).
- **NHRC, in collaboration with the Post-TRRC Unit**, to support CSOs and the media in conducting independent monitoring.

To reinforce this, one CSO emphasised that **"there should be a metric... total number of recommendations, how many have been resolved, in progress, or not started."**

MEDIUM TERM PRIORITIES (2026 – 2028)

4. Ensure accountability through prosecutions

- **Ministry of Justice, through the Special Prosecutor's Office**, to advance prosecutions of perpetrators of serious human rights violations.
- **The Government, through the Ministry of Justice**, to collaborate with ECOWAS, AU, and UN mechanisms for cross-border crimes, including the 2005 West African migrants' massacre.

These measures would send a clear signal that there is no return to impunity.

5. Strengthen institutional coordination and capacity

- **Ministry of Justice** to facilitate **regular debriefing and coordination meetings** between key actors (Post-TRRC Office, NHRC, Parliament, CSOs, and victim associations) to ensure transparency, consistency, and avoid duplication of efforts.
- The Government to provide adequate financial and human resources to institutions responsible for implementing the White Paper, enabling them to fulfil their mandates effectively.

- MoJ and NHRC, in partnership with CSOs and the media, to lead **continuous public awareness campaigns** on the TRRC recommendations, the Government White Paper, and the work of implementing entities, ensuring victims and citizens remain informed.

LONG TERM PRIORITIES (2028 AND BEYOND)

6. Promote reconciliation alongside justice

- Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Lands, Regional Government and Religious Affairs to engage religious and traditional leaders in **structured dialogues** that complement prosecutions while ensuring accountability is not compromised.
- Ministry of Justice to support and expand **community-based reconciliation programmes** that address grievances and foster local healing in collaboration with CSOs, victim-led associations, and faith-based groups.

7. Address international dimension of justice

- Ensure non-Gambian victims—such as the survivors and families of victims of the 2005 killing of immigrants—are fully included in reparations and accountability processes.
- The Ministry of Justice and NHRC should collaborate with **ECOWAS, AU, and UN** to uphold cross-border justice commitments and enhance The Gambia’s international credibility.

In sum, the transitional justice process must balance **justice, accountability, reparations, reconciliation, and institutional reform**. Short-term priorities should focus on reparations, communication, and transparency to rebuild trust. Medium-term measures should consolidate accountability and strengthen institutional coordination. Long-term strategies must embed reconciliation and international cooperation to ensure sustainability. These recommendations—grounded in victims’ voices and institutional perspectives—aim to secure justice while laying the foundation for a peaceful, inclusive, and democratic Gambia.

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APPENDIN (Thematic analysis codes for KII)

Section A: Awareness and Understanding of TRRC Findings and Government White Paper

Theme 1: Understanding and Acceptance of TRRC Findings and Recommendations

Codes: High government acceptance; Government implementation commitment; Partial rejection; Perceived insincerity in rejections.

Theme 2: Role of National Assembly in Oversight and Monitoring

Codes: Oversight function; National Human Rights Commission reports; Engagement through annual reviews; Calling government officials to account.

Theme 3: Familiarity with Legislative Framework and Obligations

Codes: Awareness of key legislative acts; Torture Act; Special Prosecutor's Act; Reparations Commission Act; Legislative prerequisites for implementation.

Theme 4: Limited Involvement in White Paper Development but Active Engagement in Review

Codes: No role in White Paper formulation; Role in oversight and implementation monitoring; Stakeholder consultations led by National Human Rights Commission; Annual reviews.

Section B: Legislative Oversight and Role of Parliament

Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Legislative Oversight and Role of Parliament

Theme 1: Delegated Oversight via National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

Codes: Oversight delegation; Interaction between Parliament and NHRC; Consultative involvement.

Theme 2: Parliamentary Structures for Oversight and Legislative Scrutiny

Codes: Human Rights Committee role; Lack of dedicated transitional justice committee; Legislative scrutiny of relevant bills.

Theme 3: Parliamentary Actions on Implementation Progress and Challenges

Codes: Formal inquiries absent; Interaction through questions and stakeholder meetings; Concern over slow pace.

Theme 4: Progress in Appointments and Legal Frameworks

Codes: Appointment of commissioners; Establishment of Special Prosecutor's Office; Legislative enactments.

Section C: Legal and Policy Reforms

Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Legal and Policy Reforms

Theme 1: Passage of Key Laws Implementing TRRC Recommendations

Codes: Victims Reparations Act passed; Special Prosecutor's Office established; Torture and Reparations laws; Presidential assent.

Theme 2: Legislative Status of Institutions (Special Tribunal, Medical Board, Reparations Commission)

Codes: Special Prosecutor's Office vs Special Tribunal; Existing Medical Boards; Legal foundation of Reparations Commission.

Section D: Budgetary Oversight

Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Budgetary Oversight of TRRC Implementation

Theme 1: Parliamentary Budget Scrutiny and Allocation

Codes: Budget debate; Allocations to reparations; Incremental budget increases; Transparency through published budgets.

Theme 2: Perceptions of Inadequate Resources

Codes: Insufficient funding; Large victim population; Monetization challenges.

Theme 3: Fiscal Constraints and Budget Realities

Codes: National resource limits; Budget envelope; Competing priorities; Budget deficit management.

Theme 4: Legislative Role vs. Executive Responsibility

Codes: Parliament allocates funds; Government responsible for resource mobilization; No parliamentary loans or grants.

Theme 5: Prospects for Supplementary Funding

Codes: Asset sales; Potential discovery of additional funds; Government sourcing responsibility.

Section E: Challenges and Opportunities

Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Challenges and Opportunities in Oversight of White Paper Implementation

Theme 1: Institutional Capacity for Oversight

Codes: Parliamentary independence; Mandated oversight; Use of reports; Committee scrutiny; Invitation of stakeholders.

Theme 2: Political Challenges in Oversight

Codes: Political party divisions; Majority power dynamics; Committee composition; Voting procedures; Political interference in legislative process.

Theme 3: Opportunities to Strengthen Parliamentary Accountability

Codes: Constitutional empowerment; Legislative authority; Need for active oversight; Holding NHRC responsible.

Section F: Victim-Centred Approach and Inclusivity

Thematic Analysis on Victim-Centred Approach and Inclusivity

Theme 1: Institutional Representation of Vulnerable Groups

Codes: Dedicated committees; Disability Act; Women's Act; Children's Act; Formal legislative inclusion.

Theme 2: The Role of the National Assembly in Inclusive Implementation

Codes: Oversight function; Policy enforcement; Legislative framework; Government responsibility.

Section G: Public Engagement and Transparency,

Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Public Engagement, Legislative Oversight, and National Assembly's Role in Transitional Justice

Theme 1: Transparency and Public Engagement Mechanisms

Codes: Open parliamentary sessions; Live streaming; NHRC responsibility for public updates; Media outreach; Community caravans and town halls.

Theme 2: Legislative Oversight and Gap Identification

Codes: Parliamentary oversight; Human Rights Committee mandate; Continuous scrutiny; Gap identification and legislative amendments.

Theme 3: Institutional and Constitutional Reforms for Checks and Balances

Codes: Need for constitutional review; Parliamentary scrutiny of executive appointments; Independence of key offices; Checks on presidential powers.

Theme 4: National Assembly's Role in the Broader Transitional Justice Framework

Codes: Law-making as foundational; post-legislative scrutiny; Member-initiated bills; Collaboration with government.

Theme 5: Legacy Aspirations for Parliament

Codes: Enacting strong laws; Firm oversight; post-legislative scrutiny as legacy; Commitment to justice and accountability.

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